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A NEW TIME FOR DENOMINATORS:
TOWARD A DYNAMIC THEORY OF PROPERTY IN THE
REGULATORY TAKINGS RELEVANT PARCEL ANALYSIS
BY
DANAYA C. WRIGHT*
Thzis Article explores the question of how the courts should
calculate the denominator in the just compensation equation. The
denominator is the amount of property a claimant owns, against which
the effects of regulation will be measured ITa landowner owns a single
acre that is severely regulated, the takings fraction for the amount of
property taken compared to that owned will approach one. If, on the
other hand, the landowner owns 100 acres and only one is regulated,
the amount of harm is only 1% in comparison to the total amount
owned This Article advocates a paradingm shift in the Supreme Court's
Talings jurisprudence on the denominator question. While many
commentators have struggled with the issue of whether the government
taking $1.00 from a homeless person should be treated differently than
taking $1.00 from a millionaire, none has satisfactorily explained how
the context of the taking and the landowner's total holdings are
relevant to the takings analysis. Richard Epstein says they are
irrelevant; the taking is the same regardless of the homeless person or
the millionaire's total or past holdings. The Court has said there is a
difference but has not given any kind of satisfactory justification. Tus
Article attempts to justify the distinction with insights from traditional
propertylaw.
In particular, the Article argues the Court should treat large
landowners differently than small landowners in making the
denominator determination, even though the large landowner may no
longer own any neighboring land In basing the argument on a little-
known nineteenth-century lateral support case, in which a landowner
was not entitled to damages for harm because his own actions made
himself vulnerable to the damage, the Article explores the question of
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the landowner whose severance of property makes her more
vulnerable to the harm caused by a newreguation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the United States Supreme Court's 25 years of fierce forays and
rapid retreats in the battle over property rights and the Takings Clause, two
intractable theoretical problems have eluded the Court's attempts to provide
guidance for state actors1 as to when a regulation will, in the words of
Justice Holmes, "go[] too far."2 Those two problems lie in identifying the
relevant parcel against which a property restriction will be weighed (i.e., the
parcel as a whole, relevant parcel, or denominator),3 and in determining the
relevance of the timing of a regulation when analyzing the extent and
reasonableness of a landowner's expectations of unregulated use for
compensation purposes.4 The first is a question about how we identify the
quantum of property "taken" by a regulation; is it one toothpick out of a very
large bundle of property rights, or is it the entirety of a relatively small
I I use the terms "state actors," "state," "government," and "agency" interchangeably to
include all governmental actors who, under the police power, have the authority to pass
legislation and regulations that affect land and other forms of property. Unless indicated
otherwise, the terms are not used to refer specifically to a particular level of federal, state, or
local government.
2 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon (Mahon), 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
3 The term "denominator," coined by Frank Michelman in 1967, refers to the total property
rights owned by the landowner against which the regulated parcel is compared. As the takings
fraction approaches one, the government is likely to be required to compensate because nearly
the totality of the landowner's property is being taken. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility,
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L.
REv. 1165, 1192 (1967); see inra Section III (discussing the denominator further).
4 The timing question, often referred to as the "notice rule," posits that acquisition of land
after a regulation becomes effective precludes compensation, and symmetrically assumes that
preregulation acquisition of land is equally worthy of compensation if it is not excluded for
some other reason. See infra Section IV (discussing the timing of the regulation); see also
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (Palazzolo), 533 U.S. 606, 632-33 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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bundle? The second is a question about the fairness of changing land-use
regulations midstream, so that a person who purchased land under one
regime might be entitled to compensation when a new, stricter regime
significantly diminishes the uses she can make of her land. These two issues
merge together when takings jurisprudence demands that we identify the
relevant parcel at some specific regulatory moment in time.
To date, the relevant parcel analysis has been a static snapshot of the
property owner's holdings and her expectations for future development at a
single point in time-when the regulation goes into effect or is applied to her
land (i.e., the regulatory moment). The parcel determination requires
identification of the relevant denominator in both physical and conceptual
space-its size and dimensions as well as the legal use and development
rights that are attached to it at the regulatory moment.' But while courts
have wrestled for nearly 25 years with identifying the physical and
conceptual parcel, they have generally ignored, until recently, the temporal
aspect of the timing of the regulation as it relates to a landowner's holdings
over time.6 Traditionally, this timing issue has been limited to a
determination of whether the relevant parcel was acquired prior to the
regulatory moment, and to a determination of the consequent expectations a
landowner might form of unrestricted development opportunities.7 Because
the timing calculation has almost always limited the relevant parcel to the
ownership interests at the time the regulation takes effect,8 the relevant
parcel determination has become a calculation of a static, independent
condition. Once the parcel has been determined, courts look at the effects of
the regulation on the parcel at the moment after enactment.
Identifying the parcel at the time of regulation, however, obscures the
way property ownership is a dynamic process in which actions prior to
enactment of the regulation, which reduce or increase a landowner's
susceptibility to harm from the regulation, can be an important variable in
5 The physical aspect of the relevant parcel analysis has generally consisted of a horizontal
and a vertical element, the horizontal element being the number of acres that will be deemed
the relevant parcel and the vertical element being the separation of the estate into airspace,
surface, subsurface, and mineral rights. The functional or conceptual aspect is the severance of
the property into different strands or property rights in the bundle, such as the rights to
exclude, alienate, develop, possess, and use the property.
6 The question of when a landowner can sue for inverse condemnation depends in part on
the timing of the regulation as compared to other development stages, such as purchasing the
land, platting it, and applying for and obtaining permits in the standard example of land
development. The doctrine of vested rights holds that a landowner may sue in inverse
condemnation if she is far enough along in the development process to have relied to her
detriment on a particular statutory and regulatory scheme. See generally STEVEN EAGLE,
REGULATORY TAKINGS, § 11-2, 704-33 (2000).
7 The timing issue is most often analyzed when the courts are considering a landowner's
reasonable investment-backed expectations just before a regulation defeats them. See, e.g.,
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe regulatory regime in place at
the time the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape the reasonableness of those
expectations.").
8 There is a minor exception for fraud. See Broadwater Farms Joint Venture v. United
States (Broadwater Farms), 35 Fed. Cl. 232, 240 (1996) (finding "no indication that plaintiff
disposed of the property in anticipation of a takings claim").
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whether a regulation goes too far.9 The United States Supreme Court
modified slightly its position that the timing of the regulation is a fixed
determinant when it rejected the categorical rule that no recovery is allowed
if the land is acquired after the regulation is enacted.'0 The Court looked
forward, past the regulatory moment in the unusual postregulation
acquisition case of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (Palazzolo)." The fairness
involved in denying a categorical rule, however, calls for a temporal
symmetry-the Court should look backwards at landowner actions that
occurred before the regulatory moment in determining regulatory impact. It
should relinquish its position that acquisition of land before a regulation is
enacted means a landowner is a passive, innocent12 victim of the harms 3 of
regulatory change. While not all landowners who purchased land before a
regulation limited their uses will be entitled to compensation under our
federal takings jurisprudence, there exists a presumption that prior
purchasers are all equally innocent in bringing about the change and that,
therefore, the only constitutional concern is the direct impact of the
9 John Echeverria noted the quandary the Court has created in identifying the relevant
parcel:
On the one hand, a rule that ignored the full extent of the owner's original ownership
would encourage land developers to sell off developable portions in order to
manufacture takings claims. Treating owners who develop their property at one time in
the same fashion as owners who develop and sell off their property in pieces would
produce equal treatment of owners who, arguably, are similarly situated. On the other
hand, if an owner sells off pieces of property without regard to and prior to the adoption
of a new regulatory regime which allegedly effects a taking, the argument for strict
application of the parcel rule based on the risk of strategic behavior is less compelling.
John D. Echeverria, A ining of the Tide. The Tahoe-Sierra Regulatory Takings Decision, 32
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11,235, 11,242 (2002).
10 A number of commentators have mentioned the issue of preregulation sale of land and
whether it should be included in the relevant parcel. They also question whether strategic
actions of landowners should factor into the takings analysis, though none has taken the
explicit stand that, in most instances, preregulation sales of land are relevant in the takings
analysis. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island: A Few Clear Answers and Many
New Questions, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,127, 10,136 (2002) (noting the unfairness of
treating landowners differently based on the timing of the regulation); John D. Echeverria, A
Prelminary Assessment of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11,112,
11,121 (2001) (questioning the extent to which a landowner's lack of investment-backed
expectations may defeat a takings claim; emphasizing the role that the timing of a restriction
plays in this issue); Benjamin Allee, Drawing the Line in Regulatory Takings Law: How a
Benefits Fraction Supports the Fee Simple Approach to the Denominator Problem, 70 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1957, 1970 (2002) (emphasizing fairness in the inquiry into whether the landowner had
preregulation intent to exercise certain property interests); Marc R. Lisker, Regulatory Takings
and the Denominator Problem, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 663, 722-23 (1996) (noting that a landowner's
knowledge that property is subject to regulations is extremely important in the analysis).
11 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
12 I use the term "innocent" not in terms of moral guilt or even criminal responsibility, but
instead as being disconnected in every way from the chain of events that eventually led to
regulations or permit denials for which a landowner is claiming harm and compensation.
13 By "harms" I mean limitations in use and development rights, restrictions on the exercise
of certain property rights, and the decline in economic value that are often attributed to the
effects of regulation.
[Vol. 34:175
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regulation on the land's uses and value. Equal innocence in causing the
regulation translates into equal rights to compensation for equal harms. I
argue in this Article, however, that not all landowners who purchase before
a regulation is enacted are innocent and therefore deserving of
compensation even when the harms are uniform. 4 To support this claim, I
propose that the Court look more closely at the dynamic nature of property
ownership over time in the relevant parcel analysis.'5 In doing so, the Court
will find that the denominator and the timing issues can be integrated in a
principled and coherent manner.
The most-cited concern with looking backwards to actions by
landowners before a regulation is enacted is that doing so raises the
possibility of treating similarly situated landowners differently. Hence, the
retiree to Florida who buys a single lot for construction of his retirement
home and the large developer who has developed and sold off all but one
remaining lot might be treated differently if construction permits are denied
for each lot and prior actions are taken into account. Because each
landowner may own only that one lot, and may ultimately suffer the same
economic loss-even a 100% economic loss-courts and commentators
reasonably argue that both should be treated equally in a takings calculation.
Under the Court's current rules, the denominator would be calculated to be
the single lot owned by each at the moment of permit denial. But I would
suggest that these two landowners are not similarly situated when we view
their use and ownership of land over time, when we recognize that value is
not determined by reference to a static set of land uses, and that any notion
of fairness cannot be determined by a snapshot view of events divorced
from their temporal and physical surroundings. Ironically, some
commentators have criticized the parcel-as-a-whole rule because it
"discriminates against those who happen to have a larger group of property
14 What I am arguing is that we should not assume that a regulation that is applicable to
multiple parcels of land would demand compensation for every landowner who owned the land
before the regulation went into effect. Instead, other factors may warrant noncompensation for
certain landowners if their preregulation activities made the situation worse. Just as there
should be no categorical rule of noncompensation for postregulation acquisition, there should
be no categorical rule of compensation for preregulation acquisition.
15 Numerous commentators have discussed the complex and contested nature of property
in general and whether takings doctrine adequately protects all the values inherent in a private
property regime. While I acknowledge the difficulty in resolving many of those disputes, I focus
here on the narrow issue of preregulation severance of land and how it should affect the
relevant parcel calculation. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, The Consequences of
Conceptualism, 41 U. MLAMI L. REV. 239 (1986) (disputing Richard Epstein's formalist notion of
property); D. Benjamin Barros, Defiming "Property" in the Just Compensation Clause, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 1853 (1995) (recognizing contradictions between utilitarian and liberal notions
of property); Gregory Daniel Page, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council and Justice Scahia's
Primer on Property Rights Advancing New Democratic Traditions by Defending the Tradition
of Property, 24 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 161 (2000) (discussing absolutist and statist
notions of constitutional property); Robert Brauneis, The Foundation of our "Regulatory
Takings" Jurisprudence: The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holnes's Opinion in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613 (1996) (discussing Justice Holmes's positivist ahistorical
notion of property).
2004]
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rights in a single place."' 6 This Article suggests that it would be
unreasonable, unfair, and discriminatory to treat different landowners the
same because we have failed to recognize their evolving actions and land
holdings. The Florida retiree and the land developer are not equally innocent
victims of regulatory harm.
The Court's current rule, which seems to be an implicit adoption of
federal circuit and state court decisions on an issue that it has not directly
explicated, appears to establish a bright-line rule. The total relevant property
owned at the regulatory moment is deemed to be the appropriate quantum
of property to be used in the takings calculation. But like most bright-line
rules, it risks being over- and under-inclusive. In many cases the relevant
parcel determination, which is often made as an initial threshold matter,
actually makes or breaks a case. 7 Despite its core relevance, the Supreme
Court has failed to develop a rule, standards, or even guidelines that might
treat landowners more fairly because reliance on bright-line rules often
seems more equitable, and no principled theory has been suggested for
changing the rule, or for justifying doing away with it altogether.
The current approach is inequitable for numerous reasons discussed
herein, and I ultimately favor a certain amount of fluidity in takings
calculations (or "muddiness" as some have called it).'" Doing away with a
bright-line rule allows for more case-specific considerations of fairness and
can avoid slippery slope problems by adoption of a set of parameters within
which the parcel determination can be maintained and philosophically
justified. Moreover, gut-level fairness is still the ultimate criteria behind
regulatory taking doctrines and Justice Holmes's magic threshold of holding
accountable regulations that go too far.
The current approach to the denominator issue is also incoherent and
illogical. To the extent prior actions of landowners that make themselves
more vulnerable to regulatory harm are excluded from the denominator
determination, horizontal and vertical severance issues are profoundly in
tension with rules of fairness and equity. Additionally, to the extent
functional severance of the relevant parcel into discernable rights-like the
rights to exclude, descent, and devise-is tied to economic value, the Court's
rules threaten to undermine our private property regime. And finally, a
snapshot theory of regulatory takings that ignores the dynamic nature of
property over time artificially attributes harm to a regulation when, in fact,
16 John E. Fee, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking Claims, 61 U. CHi. L. REV.
1535, 1552 (1994).
17 See Daniel R. Mandelker, New Property Rights Under the Takng Clause, 81 MARQ. L. REV.
9, 16 (1997).
18 See generally Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in
American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Property and Expropriations]; Carol M.
Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and the New Taldngs
Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265 (1996) [hereinafter A Dozen Propostions]; Marc Poirier,
The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOzo L. REV. 93 (2002). See intfa note 21 for
articles describing the "muddiness" of the takings doctrine.
[Vol. 34:175
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the harm is the result of a complex series of events and actions to which the
state must respond if it seeks to maintain its legitimacy.19
In formulating a theory for addressing the relevant parcel problem and
the timing problem, I look to other areas of property law for a different way
of thinking about the impact of regulations on property rights, primarily the
common law of lateral support, unity of title, and quiet enjoyment. In
particular, I propose that courts look to the voluntary actions of landowners
who sever their property-either physically, conceptually, or temporally-as
relevant factors in determining whether a land-use regulation goes too far.2 °
Courts generally ignore earlier property holdings and prior sales when
determining the relevant parcel, as though the odometer were set back to
zero at the time a regulation goes into effect. A landowner's property rights
are thereby viewed as static holdings into which a new regulation causes a
sudden restraint for which compensation may often be required. Instead
courts should look to the dynamic aspects of use and ownership of land over
time to help judge the real effects of post hoc regulation and to identify the
relevant parcel. In simplistic terms, we should look to the load the camel
was bearing before the final straw broke its back.
This Article is not intended to be a thorough exposition on the law of
regulatory takings, especially since the field is already saturated with an
impressive array of perceptive and important scholarship.2 Rather, it
suggests a paradigm shift in how we think about two particularly difficult
concepts and offers a theory that should move us beyond the impasse that
has plagued these areas of regulatory takings jurisprudence for decades. To
that end, after first explaining the two problems and why they have proved
so difficult to resolve, the Article proposes a new theory of dynamic
property and explains how it would apply in a variety of land-use contexts.
19 Regulations do not arise out of thin air. They are created in response to a series of
activities and effects that are deemed generally disruptive of the common good. See Property
andExpropriations, supra note 18, at 19-22.
20 Ironically, John Fee, who strongly advocates against a rule that would treat landowners
differently, would adopt a rule for determining the relevant parcel based "not on the property
owner's actions or the extent of her ownership, but on the economic potential of the land
itself." Fee, supra note 16, at 1537. He would allow horizontal severance, but not functional,
vertical, or temporal severance. Id at 1557. I suggest that his theory cannot justify the
distinction between horizontal and the other forms of severance, and that we must take the
owner's actions into account in all contexts.
21 Eg, John Decker Bristow, Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel: Is the Court One Step Closer to
Unravelin the Takings and Due Process Clauses 77 N.C. L. REV. 1525 (1999); J. Peter Byrne,
Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOL. L. Q. 89 (1995);
John Echeverria & Sharon Dennis, The Takings Issue and the Due Process Clause: A Way Out of
a Doctrinal Confusion, 17 VT. L. REV. 695 (1993); Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence
and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997 (1999); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A
Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1892 (1992); Frank
Michelman, Takings, 198, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1988); Stuart Miller, Triple Ways to Take:
The Evolution and Meaning of the Supreme Court's Three Regulatory Takings Standards, 71
TEMP. L. REV. 243 (1998); Poirier, supra note 18; Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed- Why the
TakIngsssue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984).
2004]
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF REGULATORY TAKINGS
The background for this discussion is, of course, the Takings Clause of
the United States Constitution, which states: "nor shall private property be
taken for public use without just compensation."22 Until 1922, the Takings
Clause was interpreted to protect property owners only against
governmental appropriations or invasions of land by requiring that if a
governmental entity wanted to take or use private land, it had to exercise its
power of eminent domain and pay for what it had taken.23 In the nineteenth
22 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause was applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in Clicago B & Q R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166
U.S. 226 (1897).
23 See, e.g., FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSUE: A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITS OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE USE OF PRIVATELY-OWNED LAND WITHOUT
PAYING COMPENSATION TO THE OWNERS 114-23 (1973) (describing early Supreme Court Takings
Clause jurisprudence and noting that, in the nineteenth century, the state and federal
governments had to pay property owners whose lands were physically taken or otherwise
physically harmed by the government's power of eminent domain, but that they did not have to
pay when harm to property value or usability resulted from the exercise of police powers); John
F. Beggs, The Theoretical Foundations of the Takings Clause and the Utilzation of Historical
Conceptions of Property in the Ecological Age, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 867, 870, 878 (1995)
(describing Justice Blackmun's view that the Takings Clause was originally adopted "as a
principally republican, communitarian phenomenon aimed at securing virtue and the common
good of the local polity, and that therefore only direct physical takings by the federal
government were intended to be compensable"); Byrne, supra note 21, at 94 ("Until 1922,
virtually no court found a taking when regulation restricted use but amounted neither to
outright expropriation nor to permanent physical occupation."); John F. Hart, Land Use Law in
the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1099,
1107-31 (2000) (describing a variety of regulatory controls on land use imposed by the colonies
and early states and arguing that James Madison, author of the Takings Clause, knew about
such regulation, "confronted the very phenomenon that has been wrongly supposed to be a
peculiarly modern one: economically burdensome land use regulations," but nevertheless chose
not to conflate regulation with appropriation when he drafted the Takings Clause"); John F.
Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and its Significance for Modem Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1252, 1299-1300 (1996) [hereinafter Colonial Land Use Lawj (analyzing the land-use
regulations of colonial America and arguing that modem land-use regulation should not be
subject to the Takings Clause contrary to popular modem legal thought; land-use regulations
existed in colonial times, the framers of the Constitution knew this, but nevertheless they did
not address regulatory concerns in drafting the Takings Clause); Edward J. Sullivan, The Taking
Issue, 5 ENVTL. L. 515, 521-22 (1975) (noting that "[an examination of legal history in America
and England shows that the [T]aking[s] [C]lause was specifically addressed to the problem of
confiscation, rather than regulation, of property," but that Mahon changed the legal landscape
regarding takings and became "the source of confusion over the taking issue today." (emphasis
in original)); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 785 (1995) ("Even after the establishment of a
compensation requirement, it applied only to interference with physical ownership, and
government routinely acted in ways that diminished the value of private property without
providing compensation."); William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Signicance of
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendmen4 94 YALE L.J. 694, 711 (1985) ("Madison
seems to have taken a rather limited view of what legal rights such a clause created: He
intended the clause to apply only to direct, physical taking of property by the federal
government. Contemporaneous observers also viewed the Fifth Amendment in this way: It
applied only to the federal government, it concerned direct takings of property, and did not, for
example, bar the government from interfering in contracts."). For a different scholarly view, see
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and early twentieth centuries, compensation cases centered exclusively on
physical appropriations of land or physical invasions of land for the public
welfare, and did not limit the rights of the government to regulate land, even
when the regulation destroyed all use and value.24
In 1922, however, the Takings Clause was radically redefined to also
require payment for governmental regulations that were so restrictive of an
owner's use, development, and possessory rights in land that the property
rights which remained became virtually useless. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon (Mahon),25 Justice Holmes reasoned that:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law.... [But] [wihen it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases
there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the
act.
26
Holmes equated the substantial infringement of the use of property by a
regulation with the appropriation of ownership of land through an exercise
of eminent domain. For Holmes, a threshold existed beyond which
compensation would be required if a regulation "goes too far" in restricting a
landowner's use of land because the effect of the restriction is just as
debilitating as outright appropriation.2
Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent: The Direct, Physical Takings Thesis
"Goes Too Fa;, "49 AM. U. L. REv. 181, 240-42 (1999) (analyzing philosophies regarding property
that were contemporaneous with the framing and ratification of the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause and concluding both that the clause's author, James Madison, intended the clause to
apply to regulatory takings as well as physical takings, and that although it remains unclear
what the states thought about regulatory takings at the time of ratification, the historical
evidence proffered by proponents of the "direct, physical takings interpretation" is insufficient
to justify their position); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 180-81 (1871) (noting that
many states had held that "for a consequential injury to the property of the individual arising
from the prosecution of improvements of roads, streets, rivers, and other highways, for the
public good, there is no redress," but opining that decisions applying this principal "have gone
to the uttermost limit of sound judicial construction," and finally holding that "taking," at least
within the meaning of the Wisconsin Constitution, whose Takings Clause is nearly identical to
that of the Federal Constitution, includes "situations where real estate is actually invaded by
superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or by having any artificial
structure placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness").
24 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1894); Lawton
v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 180-81.
25 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
26 Id at 413.
27 Although the Takings Clause had always been interpreted to be a limitation on the power
of eminent domain, it is not clear that the courts have limited the application of the expanded
regulatory takings doctrine to situations in which the regulatory agency has the power of
eminent domain. Not all governmental entities have eminent domain power, but many have
regulatory power. Thus, insofar as regulatory takings is founded on an analogy to eminent
domain, there is some question whether its reach should be limited to agency actions that could
have been accomplished through eminent domain.
28 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
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For the next forty years, however, Holmes's vision of a constitutional
check on the police power to regulate property remained relatively inchoate.
Despite a couple of important challenges to regulations that were held to
require compensation,29 the Court consistently gave great deference to
governmental restrictions unless they involved physical invasion or total
destruction of the property.30 Until the 1960s, challenges to overreaching
government regulations were caught up in the complex mire of post-Loehner
v. New York (Lochner)31 due process considerations, which were extremely
deferential to government decisions.32 This level of deference continued
throughout the Warren and the Burger eras, even as the Court was asked
numerous times to refine the parameters of when a regulation would go too
far. Its answer was as vague in 1960 as it was in 1922, when Justice Black
wrote: "The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be
taken for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."'
Justice and fairness, like going too far, gave courts very little guidance in a
burgeoning regulatory state.
Finally, in 1978, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
(Penn Central),' the Court attempted to give some substance to its rules on
regulatory takings, articulating a three-part test for determining when a
regulation would go so far as to require compensation and the exercise of
eminent domain. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated:
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court's decisions
have identified several factors that have particular significance. The economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are,
of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental
action.3 5
This three-part Penn Central balancing test did not stand alone for long,
as the next year the Court articulated a different, two-part rule in Agins v.
29 See Nectow v. City of Cambridge (Nectow), 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928) (holding zoning
power not unlimited); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (noting difficulty of
drawing bright lines of compensability).
30 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); United States v. Pewee Coal Co.,
341 U.S. 114 (1951); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); United States v. General
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256 (1939); Nectow,
277 U.S. 183 (1928); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1927); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
(Euclid), 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Arguably, these were due process cases, decided at a time when
the Court was reluctant to develop principles that clearly distinguished between due process
and just compensation claims and rules.
31 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
32 See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1962) (upholding a Kansas statute prohibiting debt
adjusting; giving great deference to the legislature's wisdom and refusing to find a due process
violation where the court disagrees with the legislature's choice).
33 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
34 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
35 Id. at 124 (citations omitted).
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City of Tiburon (Agirs). 6 Justice Powell's incarnation of a regulatory takings
test, at least in the case of a zoning ordinance, is that it goes too far if "the
ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests,... or
denies an owner economically viable use of his land."37 Although many
courts and commentators have tried to make sense of these two different
regulatory takings tests by arguing that the Penn Central test is appropriate
for as-applied challenges to regulations and the Agins test is appropriate for
facial challenges, no distinction has been respected by the Court.38 The
Rehnquist Court not only has applied the Agins test to as-applied
challenges,3" and the Penn Central test to facial challenges,4 0 but it also has
created a number of entirely new categorical rules for a variety of situations
that meld parts of each test.41 The addition of new takings tests as well as a
36 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
37 Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
38 See Danaya Wright & Nissa Laughner, Shaken, Not Stirred. Has Tahoe-Sierra Settled or
Muddied the Regulatory Takings ateisg 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11,177 (2002)
(viewing the Court's inconsistent use of the Penn Central and Agins balancing tests as
contributing to the continued muddiness of takings jurisprudence after Tahoe-Serra Pres.
Council v. Tahoe Reg7 Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)); Andrea L. Peterson, The Taking
Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I-A Critique of Current Takings Clause
Doctrine, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 1299, 1316 (1989) (outlining the four takings tests used by the
Court-Penn Central, Agins, the "no economically viable use" test, and the Lucas per se test-
and concluding it is unclear which test to apply in a given case). See also Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency (Tahoe-Sierra), 535 U.S. 302, 321 (2002) (holding Penn
Central balancing appropriate test for an arguably facial challenge).
39 See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n (Nollan), 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (finding a taking in
the conditioning of a building permit on the creation of a public easement under the Agins
"substantially advance a legitimate government interest" (or SALGI) prong); Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council (Lucas), 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (refusing to apply "harmful or noxious use"
principle to coastal regulation but instead applying Agins's definition of taking as the denial of
all economic benefit); Dolan v. City of Tigard (Dolan), 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (analyzing a takings
claim resulting from a required public easement by building on Nollan's SALGI-based essential
nexus standard to arrive at the rough proportionality standard); City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999) (using SALGI prong of Aginsto examine the proper fact-finding role
and instruction for a jury in a regulatory takings case post-Dolan).
40 See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving (Hodel), 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (finding the Indian Land
Consolation Act effected a facial taking under Penn Central); Keystone Bituminous Coal Co. v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (holding the Pennsylvania Subsidence Act was not facially
unconstitutional because of the public interest in maintaining a certain amount of coal beneath
structures); Tahoe-Sierra 535 U.S. at 321 (finding a moratorium on development did not
constitute a per se taking and that whether a temporary regulation requires compensation
should be determined using the Penn Centralfactors and not aperse rule).
41 See, e.g, Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031-32 (using economic impact prong of Agins to create a
categorical rule for 100% economic loss); Hodel, 481 U.S. at 717-18 (finding that § 207 as
amended of the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, which abolished the descent and devise
rights of owners of fractioned Indian lands, violates the Just Compensation Clause as a
categorical extension of the "character of the governmental action" prong of Penn Central);
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. (Loretto), 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1981) (narrowly
holding that a permanent physical occupation of property constitutes a compensable taking by
the government); Kaiser Aetna v. United States (Kaiser Aetna), 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979)
(holding that a property owner's right to exclude is in the category that requires compensation
for a government taking; although the court applied Penn Central balancing, it created a near-
categorical rule for core sticks).
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general increase in scrutiny has led to numerous decisions awarding
compensation for regulations that, purely under a deferential Penn Central
test, probably would not have been ordered.42 Moreover, commentators have
complained bitterly of the Court's increasing muddying of the waters with
new tests and new levels of scrutiny, its elevation of property rights
protections at the expense of public rights and the environment, and its
complete unwillingness or inability to provide stable guidance to
government regulators and lower courts as to how far government may go in
restricting property rights.4 3
On the other side, conservative justices and property rights activists
have long argued that the Penn Central balancing test is too deferential to
government, and that winning under Penn Central is near impossible. 4
Some, like Richard Epstein and Roger Marzulla, 4 argue that every limitation
on the use and exploitation of property should require compensation,
regardless of the fact that many parcels of land increase in value as a result
of regulation.4 6 Others who are less absolute in their interpretations of the
Takings Clause, like Justice Antonin Scalia, would severely limit regulatory
changes to a narrow range of acceptable activities bounded by state-law
nuisance rules or inherent limitations on property, leaving land-use controls
primarily to the market and contract mechanisms.47
Despite the different rules and the uncertainty, however, the focus of
every regulatory takings analysis since Penn Central has been on the quality
of the government's actions and its impact on the landowner. On the one
hand, the Court looks to the government's actions to see how restrictive,
42 Increased scrutiny is seen primarily in the exactions cases of Nollan, 483 U.S. 825, and
Dolan, 512 U.S. 374. Admittedly, the states had adopted a variety of rules in the exactions
context, from very deferential review to quite heightened review. The middle-tier level adopted
in Dolan supposedly strikes a balance between the extremes.
43 See Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark Has the US Supreme Court Been
Competent In Its Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Talings Law.+ 30 URB. LAW. 307
(1998) (commenting on how the past two decades of United States Supreme Court decisions in
takings law has led to the current "ad hocery" of takings jurisprudence); Wright & Laughner,
supra note 38 (discussing missed opportunities of the Court to resolve and clarify takings
jurisprudence in Tahoe-Sierra); see also supra note 21.
44 However, the government did lose under Penn Centralbalancing in KaserAetna, 444 U.S.
164, Hodel, 481 U.S. 704, arguably Loretto, 458 U.S. 419, and perhaps even First English
EvangelicalLutheran Church of Glendale v. County of L.A. (Frst English), 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
45 See generally RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985). Roger Marzulla was the Assistant Attorney General of the Environment and
Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice under Ronald Reagan, is an active
proponent of the property rights movement, and has co-authored a number of books and
articles with his wife Nancie, who is the president and chief legal counsel of Defenders of
Property Rights, an organization with a conservative property rights protectionist mission. See,
e.g., NANCIE G. MARZULLA & ROGER J. MARZULLA, PROPERTY RIGHTS: UNDERSTANDING
GOVERNMENT TAKINGS AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (1997).
46 Zoning is an excellent example of how the majority of land may increase in value as a
result of mandatory zoning, though a single parcel may not. This was the tension between the
Court's upholding of general zoning laws in Euclid, 272 U.S. 365 (1926), and why it struck down
an as-applied challenge in Nectow, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). Ironically, neither referred to the Just
Compensation Clause, but rather appear to have been due process cases.
47 See Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992).
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how important, how narrowly tailored, and how valuable the state's interests
are.48 On the other, it looks to the regulation's effects on the landowner's
ability to use, enjoy, develop, and alienate her property. This latter analysis
focuses particularly on the economic impact on the landowner and the
regulation's interference with the landowner's reasonable, investment-
backed expectations. Yet increasing levels of scrutiny may lead the Court to
look more skeptically or more deferentially on one or the other side of the
takings equation.
Between 1987 and 2000, the Court appeared to be moving toward
greater protection of property rights and greater scrutiny of governmental
regulations as Chief Justice William Rehnquist was able to piece together an
unsteady majority.49 As a result of the shift, commentators feared that the
Penn Central test was being swamped with exceptions, revisions, and
general neglect. They argued that the Court was confounding the regulatory
takings analysis with all sorts of new tests and ignoring basic public welfare
issues.50 But most recently, in 2002, the Penn Centraltest was given new life
in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
(Tahoe-Sierra)5' as the Court pulled back from what many viewed to be its
extreme property-protectionist position. The Penn Central test has again
been declared the most appropriate test for all but a small subset of unusual
situations, though it is too early to tell if the decision in Tahoe-Sierra is a
small roadbump in the general trend toward greater limits on government's
regulatory powers, or has charted a new course back toward the deference
of the Warren Court era.
52
48 This analysis comes under the "character of the government action" in Penn Central and
the "substantially advance a legitimate government interest" (SALGI) prong of Agins. And while
the Court has been relatively deferential in this test, usually adopting the same level of scrutiny
as it applies to the public use requirement under eminent domain, there has been an elevation of
scrutiny in certain cases, especially in the exactions context. See Dolan, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994)
(holding that an exaction must be roughly proportional in nature and extent to the proposed use
of the land); Lucas; 505 U.S. 1003; Nollan, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987) (holding that a reasonable
nexus must exist between an exaction and a legitimate police power purpose). But see City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. (Del Monte Dunes), 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999)
(narrowing scope of heightened scrutiny to exactions cases); Santa Monica Beach Ltd. v.
Superior Court, 968 P.2d 993, 1003-07 (Cal. 1999) (state court agonizing over the relationship
between the due process and just compensation requirements in a rent control situation);
Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania (Matdupongo Mll, 719 A.2d 19, 23 (Pa Commw.
1998) (state courts struggling with due process implications).
49 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (5-4 decision with one concurring opinion and one
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part); Del Monte Dunes 526 U.S. 687 (5-4 decision
with one opinion in which four justices joined, concurring in part and dissenting in part); E.
Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (5-4 decision with one concurring opinion and separate
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part); Dolan, 512 U.S. 374 (5-4 decision); Lucas, 505
U.S. 1003 (two dissenting opinions filed and one separate statement); Nollan, 483 U.S. 825 (5-4
decision).
50 See supra note 21.
51 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
52 The Warren Court granted great deference to state and federal legislatures to explore
regulatory policies that might affect property rights by soundly rejecting the substantive
economic due process of the Lochner era. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1962)
(noting that while legislative bodies may make choices the Court deems unwise, the Court is
20041
HeinOnline  -- 34 Envtl. L. 187 2004
ENVIRONMENTAL LA W
Whether the Court is applying the Penn Central balancing test, the
Agins test, or one of the categorical rules developed in the late 1980s and
1990s, two issues remain central to any regulatory takings analysis. The first
is a determination of what property rights are taken by the challenged
regulation. Inherent in that determination is a comparison of the rights taken
with the property rights retained, what has come to be called the "takings
fraction" (the rights taken or restricted are placed in the numerator and the
total rights of the property owner are placed in the denominator). As the
fraction approaches one, and the rights taken approach the total rights
owned, the scrutiny on the government's justification for the regulation
increases. Using the bundle of sticks metaphor that is common in property
parlance,' when the numerator is a small toothpick and the denominator is
the entire bundle, the likelihood of the Court requiring compensation is
small. Where the numerator is a large portion of the bundle, or cuts across
every stick in the bundle, the likelihood of compensation increases until it
becomes mandatory if certain core sticks or the entire bundle is taken.54
The second issue is the timing of the regulation with respect to the
property rights of the landowner. Implicit in this determination is an
assumption that if a landowner purchases land that is already heavily
regulated, at a devalued price, she may not seek compensation for the effect
of the regulation because she did not lose any rights that she in fact
possessed.5 This is termed the "notice rule," which presumes that a person
cannot complain of restrictions to land use when she bought the land
knowing of those restrictions. She never possessed the right to be free of
regulation, presumably did not pay for unregulated property, and therefore
cannot complain if prior regulations restrict her ability to use or develop her
land. She took with actual or constructive notice of the limitations.56
Conversely, an owner of unregulated land has a better takings claim if a new
regulation is enacted after acquisition that severely devalues or restricts his
once free land. This timing determination generally looks to see who was the
owner of record at the time the regulation was enacted. However, the
not to interfere unless there is a violation of federal law); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962) (holding the state only to a reasonableness standard in determining whether state
regulation was burdensome enough to violate the Fifth Amendment).
53 See WESLEY HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCErTIONs 27-31 (1923).
54 The bundle of sticks metaphor is often used by judges when analyzing the denominator
question. See, e.g., Fla. Rock v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21, 42 (1999) ("[Tlhough it is true that
not every strand in the bundle was cut,... the thin handful which remains little resembles the
full sheaf once held by Florida Rock. It strains the Court's sense of logic to suggest this well-
pruned parcel is still whole." (internal citations omitted)).
55 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606, 626-30 (2001) (noting that although notice is relevant, a
"claim is not barred by the mere fact that title was acquired after the effective date of the state
imposed restriction"); Forest Products Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (espousing a reasonableness standard for expectations and noting that "one who buys
with knowledge of a restraint assumes the risk of economic loss"); Ciampitti v. United States
(Ciampitti), 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 320-21 (1991) (noting that appellant's investment-backed
expectations were not reasonable because he was aware of the regulations that would
adversely affect development prior to his purchase).
56 Called the "notice rule" in scholarship, its most detailed exposition is in Palazzolo, 533
U.S. at 626-30.
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analysis was complicated in 1992 by Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
(Lucas)57 and in 2001 in PaIazzolo.5 Lucas held that changes in ownership
that overlapped the regulation, even though arguably only changes in
corporate structure, affect the relevant parcel calculation.5 9 Conversely,
Palazzolo held that such changes did not affect the takings calculation.60
Finding the right moment to measure the relevant parcel to determine the
effects of government regulation has been an issue overshadowing
numerous decisions, but the Court has yet to tackle it head-on.
Both the relevant parcel and the timing determinations must be made in
every regulatory takings calculation. Under the Court's current analysis,
however, these two determinations, while possibly quite difficult for a court
to make in any given instance, are viewed independently of one another.
61
The Court first determines the regulatory moment, then it calculates the
relevant parcel, and then it analyzes the effect of the regulation on the
parcel. Yet this analysis arguably focuses only on the one-way impact of
regulation on a relatively static bundle of property rights. There is little room
in the Court's jurisprudence to think more dynamically about the interaction
between regulation and property ownership. In all fairness, the Court should
look at how the landowner's actions may influence the way the regulation
affects the land.
Although impact of a regulation on a landowner may vary depending on
different circumstances of each landowner, the Court's current approach to
determining the relevant parcel is inflexible. This relatively static analysis in
no way seeks to uncover the dynamic series of actions that a landowner may
have taken before the regulation was enacted which made her vulnerable to
harm from the regulation or the way in which certain behavior by
landowners may have increased the regulatory burdens.62 By considering the
57 In Lucas, Justice Scalia acknowledged that there are two relevant time periods for a
regulatory takings analysis: when the state's background principles of property law are settled
and when the regulation is passed. To the extent the regulation limits a property right that
existed at the former time, compensation will be due. Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027, 1030 (1992).
58 In Palazzolo, the question was whether postregulation acquisition of the land would
preclude an inverse condemnation claim and a majority of the court said no, though for
different reasons apparently. 533 U.S. at 618, 639.
59 Justice Blackmun points out that David Lucas is a "contractor, manager, and part owner"
of the Wild Dune development on the Isle of Palms and had lived there since 1978. In 1986,
however, he purchased two of the last four pieces of vacant property, which constituted a
change in ownership from the development corporation of which Lucas was a part-owner, to
David Lucas as an individual. Justice Scalia's majority opinion makes no note of the nominal
change in ownership; rather, the analysis begins with Lucas's purchase in 1986. Lucas, 505 U.S.
at 1038. Although there were three intervening owners of lot 22, the record does not state
whether Lucas was in any way involved in these prior purchases or why, if he was not involved,
the prior owners did not retain the land and try to develop it themselves. Id. at 1038 n.3.
60 533 U.S. at 626-27.
61 See generally Joel Burcat & Julia Glencer, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency: Is There a There There?, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
11,212 (2002) (discussing the current confusion in denominator rules).
62 For example, a landowner may create wetlands by dispelling surface water from one
parcel onto another, or a landowner may fill previously existing wetlands, so that in either
instance a regulation is necessary to prevent the destruction of critical wetlands. The
2004]
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relevant parcel as having a robust temporal component, however, we apply a
takings calculation that more coherently accommodates the fact that
property rights are only meaningful over time.6 Because we erjoy and
exploit property rights in time and over time, recognizing the dynamic
character of property would help resolve the intractable denominator and
timing problems.
III. THE DENOMINATOR PROBLEM
Calculating the relevant parcel or identifying the denominator' has
been a conceptual difficulty since the birth of regulatory takings in 1922 and
has remained intractable through the Court's most recent decisions in
Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra65 Put most succinctly, the problem lies in
identifying the bundle from which a particular property right has been taken.
The Court of Federal Claims explained it this way:
Before the court can determine whether the regulation had the effect of taking
all economically viable use of the property, the property needs to be defined.
Since the test for regulatory taking requires the court "to compare the value
that has been taken from the property with the value that remains in the
property, one of the critical questions is determining how to define the unit of
property 'whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction.'" 66
But identifying the denominator of the takings fraction is not simple.
Justice Brandeis, in his dissent in Mahon, noted that "values are relative" and
"[tihe sum of the rights in the parts can not be greater than the rights in the
whole." 7 Frank Michelman, in his important 1967 Harvard Law Review
article, labeling it for the first time the "denominator problem," noted that
the "difficulty is aggravated when the question is raised of how to define the
destruction of man-made and natural wetlands must be reduced because the growth of cities
and towns has placed greater and greater strains on the water supply in most parts of this
country.
63 Although we often think of property in terms of possessions and physical objects which
we own at a certain time, the property rights protected by law are rights that have value only
because they are stable and enduring, because when I sell them to another, the grantee needs
some assurance that she receives the same thing I sold. The same cannot be said about other
rights that may fluctuate with the economic, regulatory, and legal marketplaces.
64 I use the terms "relevant parcel" and "denominator" interchangeably to indicate the sum
total property rights against which the takings analysis should be made. The "parcel-as-a-whole"
rule is one approach to determining the appropriate level of property rights, but it is not the
only rule. See Coast Range Conifers, LLC v. Oregon (Coast Range Conifers), 76 P.3d 1148 (Or.
Ct. App. 2003), in which the Oregon Court of Appeals rejected the parcel-as-a-whole rule in state
talings jurisprudence, while acknowledging that it did apply in the federal context. Id at 1158.
65 The Court's most recent statement on the Takings Clause, Brown v. Legal Foundation of
Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003), did not have to directly address the issue of the relevant parcel
because it was dealing with laws requiring the use of interest on lawyer trust funds for funding
legal aid.
66 Brace v. United States (Brace), 48 Fed. Cl. 272, 279 (2000) (quoting Keystone Bituminous
Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987)).
67 Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 419 (1922).
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'particular thing' whose value is to furnish the denominator of the
fraction."6"
The difficulty encountered in the denominator calculation is whether to
consider, for example, a landowner's ten acres, of which nine are
developable and one is an undevelopable wetlands, or just the one restricted
acre. If the full ten acres are considered the relevant parcel, then the
landowner suffers only a ten percent loss in value of the entire lot. If only
the one acre serves as the denominator, the landowner may suffer a
complete loss. Not surprisingly, landowners advocate for the smallest
possible denominator while the government advocates for the largest
denominator.
The relevant parcel calculation is quite simple for property owners with
small holdings-one acre of wetlands, a single eagle feather, or a residential
lot that has been downzoned-and cases involving unified small holdings
generally do not raise the issue explicitly.69 It becomes much more
controversial when a landowner owns many acres of land, only some of
which are restricted by a new regulation.70 The underlying question facing
courts making the relevant parcel determination is whether it is fair or
constitutional to treat small landholders differently than large landholders
when a regulation has the same impact on the same-sized parcel of land, but
the remainder of unregulated landholdings are vastly different.71
And the Court's current rule, if we could call it that, is both vague and
unhelpful. On the one hand, the Court has repeatedly stated that it will look
at the entire parcel, or the parcel as a whole, when considering the effects of
a regulation.72 Thus, it will not sever airspace rights from the rest of the fee
simple interest in land, nor will it sever 17 acres of wetlands from one acre
of uplands.71 In refusing to accede to the landowner's characterization of the
property as only that which is ultimately regulated, the Court has frequently
repeated that it always looks to the parcel as a whole. But in fact it has not
always adhered to that nile, having severed subsurface rights in Mahon,74
68 Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of "Just Compensation"Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1192 (1967).
69 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (restricting a single eagle feather); Nectow, 277 U.S.
183 (1928) (restricting a single residential lot).
70 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (restricting a proposed 74 lot subdivision); Ciampitti 22 Cl.
Ct. 310 (1991) (restricting 18 acres of a 45 acre purchase); Penn Centra, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
(restricting vertical development above a building).
71 Consider the difference in the effects of taking one dollar from a homeless person and
one dollar from Bill Gates. Numerous philosophers have discussed the declining marginal utility
of the dollar as a person's total wealth increases. Jeremy Bentham talked about it with relation
to goods in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, 934-35 (Douglas Greenwald ed., 1982). An excellent
summary of its history in the context of progressive income taxation can be found in Martin J.
McMahon & Alice J. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the Case for Progressive Taxation,
4 FLA. TAX. REV. 1, 38-43 (1998). See also RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2 (4th
ed. 2003); JONATHAN BARON, MORALITY AND RATIONAL CHOICE 160 (1993).
72 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630-32; Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302,
327 (2002).
73 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630-32.
74 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922).
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rights to descent and devise in Hodel v. Irving (Hodel),7 and the right to
exclude the public from a dredged channel in Kaiser Aetna v. United States
(Kaiser Aetna).76 At the same time, it has chosen not to directly confront the
issue of the relevant parcel in cases involving landowners who sold or
partitioned their property before the regulation and then found themselves
especially susceptible to harm because the entirety of the property they still
owned was now heavily regulated.7 7 While the Court says it adheres to the
parcel-as-a-whole rule, it has not actually applied the rule in difficult cases,
nor explained the parameters of the rule when it has haphazardly applied it.
Moreover, there has been some question whether the Court was firmly
behind the parcel-as-a-whole rule. Justice Scalia dropped a footnote in Lucas
in 1992 calling into question the Court's commitment to the rule which
raised some confusion among lower federal and state courts as to whether
the rule remained viable.7' Justice Scalia suggested that where a diminution
in property value is substantial but less than 100%, the parcel-as-a-whole rule
might be rejected in order to view the regulation as an impermissible
deprivation of the portion of property taken.79 Justice Kennedy later referred
to the Lucas footnote as "express[ing] discomfort with the logic of this
rule,""0 though the Court ultimately strongly reaffirmed it in Tahoe-Sierra"'
The discomfort with the rule comes from those who, like Justice Scalia, feel
that taking a dollar from a homeless person is functionally equivalent to
taking a dollar from a millionaire; or taking ninety-nine cents is the same as
taking a dollar. However, many people are comfortable with a rule that
acknowledges the relational character of property and that the character of
a governmental action can be different for differently situated persons.8 2 The
denominator question, therefore, not only raises issues of mathematical
precision, but it fundamentally concerns issues of fairness and equal
treatment which can only be adjudicated by acknowledging context and
prior actions.
75 481 U.S. 704, 717-18 (1987).
76 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (holding that landowners who developed an entire
subdivision and marina were held entitled to compensation when the federal navigational
servitude was applied to their newly dredged channel in a tidal pond that had been privately
owned and was contiguous to the rest of their upland development).
77 Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007 (1992); KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 179
78 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016-17 n.7; see also Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631 (expressing
"discomfort" with measuring value of the whole parcel); Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 799 A.2d 751, 767 (Pa. 2002) (focusing on parcel as a whole).
79 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016-17 n.7. I would suggest that Justice Scalia's footnote is not a
rejection of the parcel-as-a-whole rule so much as a criticism of the apparent result that 100%
economic loss results in automatic compensation while 99% loss would not. That incongruity,
justifiably, is problematic, though of course the line-drawing problem then raises its head. If 99%
is so close to 10096 that compensation should be required, then what about 95%, 90%, 80%, and
so on? I suggest Justice Scalia was simply stating that under Penn Central balancing, 99% loss
would also go too far and that therefore the outcomes would not be so significant. But this is
not the first time my interpretation of judicial dicta deviates from the interpretation by others.
80 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631.
81 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002) (applying the parcel-as-a-whole rule while rejecting the lower
court's division into temporal segments).
82 See Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienabil't, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1849 (1987).
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Today, courts and commentators tend to analyze the denominator in
four ways: physically (both horizontally and vertically), functionally, and
temporally. While all four raise complex issues for the courts, there have
been few attempts to rationalize and define how these four dimensions of
the relevant parcel should be made. None, however, adequately considers a
landowner's actions over time, and particularly a landowner's preregulation
severance which effectively diminishes the denominator, in making these
determinations.
The following analysis of each of these four methods of categorizing the
denominator notes both the practical problems that have plagued the courts
in trying to develop rules on when severance is acceptable and when it is
not. It also explores the conceptual incoherence in the idea of severance and
the way that incoherence manifests itself in each context. While the
Supreme Court and the lower courts have attempted to, or claimed to, adopt
bright-line rules regarding how the relevant parcel is to be determined in
space, time, and function, the problems inherent in line drawing as well as
the problems inherent in not drawing lines can be identified. Though many
critics advocate the muddy vagueness of takings doctrine, s3 and I myself lean
in that direction, the problem with the denominator is that neither bright-line
rules nor muddy standards adequately acknowledge the underlying issue,
which is that property rights are dynamic, ever-changing, and fundamentally
in tension with the purpose and language of the Takings Clause.
A. Hoizontal Severance
While the Supreme Court has not spoken directly on the issue of
horizontal severance, numerous lower federal and state courts have. The
question posed with horizontal severance is how to determine the size of the
relevant parcel when a landowner owns one hundred acres, only ten of
which are affected by a regulation. Is the denominator one hundred acres or
ten acres? In general, the trend is to look to the largest parcel that is
reasonably similar to the regulated lands. This "rule" has two obvious
weaknesses: What constitutes similarly-situated or relevant, and at what
point in time do we calculate the relevant parcel if the landowner has
previously sold portions of land adjacent to or similarly situated to the now-
regulated allegedly taken land?
One useful test for analyzing horizontal severance was articulated in the
1991 case of Ciampitti v. United States (Ciampitti).4 The United States
Court of Claims was faced with a developer who had made seven separate
purchases of land and had developed some, which were then sold. The
developer was in the process of developing portions of the seventh
purchase, which consisted of 45 noncontiguous acres, including
approximately 14 acres of wetlands. Although Ciampitti sought a fill permit
only for the 14 acres, which was denied, and then claimed a taking of those
83 Property and Expropriations, supra note 18; Poirier, supra note 18.
84 22 C1. Ct. 310 (1991).
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acres, the court held that the entire 45 acres of purchase seven was the
relevant parcel.8 5 As the court explained:
Factors such as the degree of contiguity, the dates of acquisition, the extent to
which the parcel has been treated as a single unit, the extent to which the
protected lands enhance the value of remaining lands, and no doubt many
others would enter the calculus. The effect of a taking can obviously be
disguised if the property at issue is too broadly defined. Conversely, a taking
can appear to emerge if the property is viewed too narrowly. The effort should
be to identify the parcel as realistically and fairly as possible, given the entire
factual and regulatory environment.
8 6
The Ciampitti factors of contiguity, date of acquisition, uniform
treatment, and the like have been cited by numerous courts as relevant to
determining the horizontal dimension of the relevant parcel even as they
ignore the last elements-reminiscent of ad hoc balancing-the realistic and
fair identification in light of the entire factual and regulatory environment.
87
And Ciampitti has been used primarily in the context of section 404 permit
denials.8 8 These challenges occur when a landowner seeks a dredge and fill
permit in order to develop and then sell the land, but is stalled at the first
stage, before he can sell anything. Thus, at the regulatory moment (when the
permit is denied) the landowner still often owns the entirety of the full
parcel and therefore suffers only a partial taking of less than total loss in
economic value of the entire lot. 89 For instance, a landowner who owned
2,500 acres, sought to develop 62 acres, and requested a section 404 permit
for 9 acres, was denied compensation when the court viewed the relevant
parcel to be the 62 acres, not the 9 acres. 90 Notably, however, it did not
consider the relevant parcel to be the 2,500 acres, because only the 62 acre
parcel was being developed and was therefore being treated similarly by the
landowner.91 Where a landowner owns significantly more land than the
85 Id. at 320.
86 Id. at 318-19.
87 See, e.g., Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. v. Dist. of Columbia (Dist. Intown Props.), 198 F.3d 874,
880 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Brace, 48 Fed. Cl. 272, 280 (2000); BroadwaterFarms, 35 Fed. Cl. 232, 239
(1996); Machipongo Land & Coal Co., Inc. v. Pennsylvania (Machipongo V), 799 A.2d 751, 768-
69 (Pa 2002); K & K Constr., Inc. v. Dep't. of Natural Res. (K& KConstr.), 575 N.W.2d 531, 536
(Mich. 1998).
88 A dredge and fill permit from the Army Corps of Engineers is required to fill navigable
waters or wetlands adjacent to navigable waters under Pub. L. No. 92-500 § 2, 86 Stat. 884 (Oct.
18, 1972), amending the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344) (2000).
89 Of course, there are instances in which a landowner has already developed and sold off
all nonregulated lands and is left with only the wetlands, now subject to regulation. The
dynamic denominator rule for which this article advocates will account for exactly that
situation. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606, 613 (2001) (after selling off parcels, Palazzolo was left
with 20 acres, 18 being wetlands); Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007 (1992) (After developing and
selling off most of the lots in the Wild Dunes Development, Lucas was barred from erecting any
permanent habitual structures on his last two undeveloped parcels.).
90 Forest Property, Inc. v. United States (Forest Property), 177 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
91 Id. at 1365.
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amount affected by the regulation, Ciampitti helps define the total amount
that will be considered the relevant parcel.92
The lower courts are split, however, on whether land that was already
developed and sold before the regulation went into effect can be accounted
for in the relevant parcel calculation. In Ciampitti, the court excluded from
the relevant parcel calculation those lands which were acquired in purchase
seven in 1983, but were not still owned by Ciampitti in 1986 when the
permits were denied.93 But the court gave no explanation or justification of
its decision to exclude the sold parcels, nor did the issue matter under the
particular circumstances of this case since adequate "relevant" land
remained in purchase seven to offset the affected acreage.
Consistent with Ciampitti, most courts have refused to include lands
previously sold in the relevant parcel. Although the landowner bought 311.7
acres in a single purchase, the court excluded 261 acres previously sold in
1968-four years before enactment of the regulation requiring a section 404
permit-from the denominator calculation in Palm Beach Isles Associates v.
United States.94 The court found that because the 261 acres were separated
from the remaining 50.7 acres by a road, and because Palm Beach Isles
Associates "never planned to develop the parcels as a single unit,... [it
would be] inappropriate to consider those transactions to have occurred in
the context of the substance of a regulatory structure that was not in place
at the relevant times."95 Similarly, in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States
(Loveadies),98 the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
excluded not only 199 developed and previously sold acres, but also 38.5
acres of land the State of New Jersey required to remain undeveloped
through a settlement agreement that gave the landowner permission to fill
and develop 12.5 acres.97 When the section 404 permit for the 12.5 acres was
denied, the court in Loveladies held the relevant parcel to be only the 12.5
acres that were denied the permit and not the 250 acres the landowner had
purchased originally, nor the 199 acres already sold. Most courts have
excluded from the relevant parcel previously sold lands, especially lands
developed and sold before the regulatory regime went into place.9
92 Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 259, 261 n.21 (2001), affd, 303 F.3d 1349 (Fed.
Cir. 2002); K& KConsir, 575 N.W.2d at 536-37; see also Brace, 51 Fed. Cl. 649 (using Ciampitti
factors to limit relevant parcel to less than the total land owned); E. Cape May Ass'n v. Dep't of
Envtl. Prot., 777 A.2d 1015, 1025 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (same).
93 Ciampitti, 22 C1. Ct. 310, 320 (1991).
94 208 F.3d 1374, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
95 Id at 1381.
96 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
97 Id. at 1181.
98 Forest Property, 177 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (deeming 62 acres of a residential
subdivision the relevant parcel out of 2,500 acres when only the 62 were sold to plaintiff for a
development that required a permit to fill 9.4 acres); Broadwater Farms, 35 Fed. Cl. 232 (1996)
(deeming relevant parcel to be 27 lots in phase three of a 51-lot development, excluding the 24
lots of phase two already sold); Machipongo I, 719 A.2d 19, 27 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998)
(rejecting, in dicta, the idea of including previously sold lands because "[ulsing land once
owned by the landowner to arrive at a denominator ignores that the property no longer belongs
to the landowner to do with as he pleases"); see also Volkema v. Dep't of Natural Res., 542
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A few courts, however, may have included previously sold land in the
relevant parcel calculation. Whether they have done so is somewhat unclear
for various reasons. For example, in the early case of Deltona Corp. v.
United States,9 the court did not specify whether the denominator included
all five phases of the development, two of which had been completed and
sold prior to the 1972 Clean Water Act amendments, or only the three
developed after 1972. The court found no taking from denials of section 404
permits for portions of two later phases because all of the third parcel and
portions of the other two were developable."°° In an unusual exactions
situation, the Maryland Court of Appeals found that the relevant parcel
included lands previously developed and sold, but the issue was over
development agreements to reserve a certain amount of acreage as
recreational and open space to serve the entire three phases of the
development, which the landowner had put off until the last stage.1"' When
he was then forced to leave a significant proportion of the final phase
undeveloped, and then sought compensation for a taking, his case was
rejected primarily because the open space requirement served more acres
than those he still owned in the last phase."0 2 And in Machipongo Land &
Coal Co. v. Commonwealth (Maehipongo V),' 03 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court adopted a "flexible approach" that would look at "the timing of
transfers, if any, in light of the developing regulatory environment" as one of
many factors."°4 Though the court remanded the case for factual
determinations necessary to making the denominator determination, this
somewhat more inclusive approach might allow for consideration of
previously sold lands.
It would seem, however, that the lower courts considering whether to
include previously sold lands in the denominator are not likely to look
broadly at all previously owned lands of a taldngs claimant, but instead
focus on lands strategically sold in anticipation of greater regulatory
burdens. In Broadwater Farms Joint Venture v. United States (Broadwater
Farns),1 5 the court explicitly refused to include in the relevant parcel
analysis the lands in the second phase of a project, though it included lands
in the third phase, because the second phase had been developed and sold
before the Army Corps of Engineers became involved in the matter.10 6 The
court would not include the lands that had already been sold because it
N.W.2d 282, 285 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (defining relevant parcel as 24.6 acres of 45 acre tract that
were not developed prior to passage of state wetland protection act).
99 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
100 At least one court believed it was the entire 10,000 acres of all five parcels that was
included in the denominator. Machipongo I, 719 A.2d at 27.
101 City of Annapolis v. Waterman (Waterman), 745 A.2d 1000 (Md. 2000).
102 Arguably, however, Waterman was decided on contract and equity grounds. Inclusion of
the previously developed and sold parcels logically followed from the developer's promise to
leave a certain amount of open space in order to obtain the development permits for the first
four phases. Id at 1002.
103 799 A.2d 751 (Pa. 2002).
104 Id. at 768.
105 35 Fed. Cl. 232 (1996).
106 Id. at 239-40.
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"ha[d] no indication that plaintiff disposed of the property in anticipation of
a takings claim. It would not realistically reflect plaintiff's property interest
to charge it now for property it did not own at the time of the taking."107 But
in a recent Rhode Island case, what looked like strategic severance was
rewarded with an order of compensation.'10 The most accurate statement of
the courts' treatment of previously sold land, therefore, is a presumption
against considering land already sold prior to regulation or permit denial,
with perhaps an exception for strategically severed lands. 109
But is there any legitimate reason to exclude already severed lands
when the severance makes the landowner more vulnerable to harms from
the regulation regardless of the landowner's motives? Why would
consideration of previously severed lands not realistically reflect a
claimant's property interests when we can assume the claimant would retain
the economic benefit or the exchange value from the sale? A landowner who
no longer owns severed parcels at the time of the regulation presumably
does own the money or other assets that she received in exchange for the
land. Should landowners who strategically sever their developable lands be
treated differently than landowners who innocently sever and develop their
lands, when both receive the same value for the lands they sold? Intentions,
even when strategic, should not be included in the relevant parcel
calculation, especially when both sets of landowners have already received
some benefit for the severance of lands that made the retained land more
vulnerable to the regulation. 0
From a purely physical perspective, the Penn Centralcase offers a good
example of the intractability of the horizontal severance problem. In that
case, Penn Central Transportation was prohibited from building an office
tower over Grand Central Station in New York City because the site had
been designated a historic landmark under the Landmarks Preservation Law
of 1965.111 The plaintiffs argued that its airspace rights were taken by
operation of the law; namely, that because it could not build in the space
107 Id at 240.
108 Woodland Manor, 11 v. Reisma, No. C./K PC89-2447, 2003 WL 1224248, at *15 (R.I. Super.
Feb. 24, 2003). While numerous courts and scholars have obliquely referred to strategic actions
by landowners to set up their takings claim, the discomfort with such actions has usually been
with the bad faith manipulation of a landowner, not the arguably innocent actions that
effectively create a takings claim. See, e.g, Animas Valley Sand & Gravel v. Bd. of Comm'rs of
La Plata County (Animas Valej), 38 P.3d 59 (Colo. 2001) (excluding from the takings analysis
4.65 acres sold to the president and majority shareholder of the company which owned the
remaining 42 acres).
109 See Loveladies, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (rejecting 250 acre and 51 acre parcels, and
instead focusing on only the 12.5 acres that were denied a permit); K & K Constr., 575 N.W.2d
531 (Mich. 1998) (including three out of four parcels, but remanding to determine if the fourth
that had already been developed should be included); Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d
528 (Wisc. 1996) (excluding 239.6 acres previously sold from a 250 acre lot, but including the
remaining 10.4 acre parcel rather than 8.2 acres that were downzoned to conservation).
110 The assumption I am making here is that had the landowner not severed and sold the land
before the regulation went into effect, the relevant parcel would be sufficiently large that no
compensation likely would be required under Penn Centra balancing.
111 Penn Centra, 438 U.S. 104, 109 (1978) (citing N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0 etseq.
(1976)).
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over the terminal, 100% of its airspace above the eight stories of the terminal
was taken. In rejecting this sort of vertical segmenting of the plaintiffs
property,"2 the Court instead went to the opposite extreme, holding that the
relevant horizontal parcel was the entire city tax block designated as the
landmark site, not just the land under the terminal building. It also evaluated
the economic impact of the Landmarks Law by reference to the
transferability of the airspace rights to eight other parcels within the vicinity
of the terminal. As Justice Brennan explained:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments
and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been
entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has
effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action
and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a
whole. 113
The obvious question ignored by the Court is just how far out we look
to determine the relevant parcel. While it rejected narrowing the rights to the
airspace, the Court could have held the relevant parcel to be the land
occupied by the terminal; or, as it did for the takings analysis, the land
occupied by the terminal and the rest of the city tax block; or, as it did for
purposes of determining economic impact, the plaintiffs land holdings in the
relevant city block plus eight other parcels of land owned within the vicinity
of the terminal. Where should the Court stop? Should it stop at land owned
across the street, two blocks away, land in uptown Manhattan, land in New
Jersey, or perhaps even the aggregate of all land owned by the plaintiff
anywhere in the country at any time in its history? There is no clear answer
to this line-drawing problem because there is no principled way to identify
the relevant parcel from a purely horizontal perspective. If land across the
street can be considered part of the relevant parcel, then why not land
across the Hudson River, or across the continent?'
14
Similarly, the Court had an opportunity to address horizontal severance
in 1979 in Kaiser Aetna 15 but did not do so. Despite the fact that the
plaintiffs had owned a common piece of land and were developing a major
residential development in Honolulu, which included a marina, Justice
Rehnquist did not engage the denominator issue in holding that the right to
exclude the public from a newly dredged channel and marina was the
relevant parcel." 6 From a horizontal perspective we could say that the land
under the pond, now made navigable as a result of the dredging, and
therefore subject to public access under the federal navigational servitude,
should be treated distinctly from the upland portions being developed at a
significant profit. But the Court never acknowledged the existence of the
112 See inra Section I1.B (discussing vertical severance).
113 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31.
114 See Brace, 48 Fed. Cl. 272 (2000) (involving a parcel that included lands across the street
and even down the street as relevant).
115 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
116 Id. at 180.
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upland portions, even though they were contiguous, purchased in the same
transaction, developed as an integrated unit, and the dredged channel clearly
related to the use of the upland marina." 7 The failure to even address the
extensive landholdings, significant profit, and successful development of the
upland lots in Kaiser Aetna reveals a blind spot in the Court's jurisprudence
that it seems completely comfortable avoiding at the expense of the public
taxpayers and to the benefit of large-scale developers.
Though the Ciampitti factors claim to rely heavily on contiguity, single
purchase, and integrated development scheme, none of these factors appear
to be logically necessary."1 Ciampitti itself was in fact a case about
noncontiguous parcels that were considered as one because they were
purchased together in a single transaction. 1 9 Without discussing it, the court
certainly did not consider contiguity to be a necessary element. But without
contiguity, the relevant parcel determination becomes very fluid, for when
push comes to shove, none of the Ciampitti factors are necessary elements.
For instance, a single transaction is not necessary, for a railroad that
acquired a two mile corridor through 47 different transactions could surely
not complain if the entire corridor were treated as the relevant parcel. Nor is
contiguity necessary, for landowners may treat different sections of their
land differently, part being used as a road and part as residential home lots.
Such differential treatment would not be likely to lead a court into
considering the two parts as different parcels in analyzing a zoning or
development permit application. 120
The problem with horizontal severance is that in some cases, especially
for landowners of large holdings, the outside endpoint for the denominator
might be so great that no governmental regulation would get the takings
fraction beyond a minimal amount.1 21 On the other extreme, a landowner of
only small holdings is far more likely to receive compensation because the
denominator is small, regardless of the landowner's prior actions,
landholdings, intentions, or strategic severance of the regulated parcel.
22
117 Id at 167.
118 Ciampitti 22 C1. Ct. 310, 318 (1991).
119 Id. at 320.
120 BroadwaterFarms, 35 Fed. Ci. 232, 239 (1996). This is the situation in Dist. Intown Props.,
198 F.3d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1999), where the owner of an apartment building in Washington, D.C.
tried to claim that the open spaces, parking lots, and yards around the building should be
considered as separate lots for takings purposes when the historic preservation laws prevented
building more apartments surrounding the principal building. The court noted that the fact that
the landowner paid the yard maintenance fees out of the same account as the building's
common space maintenance fees refuted any claim that the landowner treated the yard and the
buildings as separate properties. Id. at 880.
121 Fee, supm note 16, at 1552.
122 There is some indication that David Lucas did exactly this-by transferring the two
affected lots out of the corporation in which he was a principal stockholder and into his private
ownership, he strategically reduced the takings denominator to exactly the parcels affected by
the regulation. See Luca!; 505 U.S. 1003, 1038 (1992). John Fee suggests that we should not look
to landowner's actions in determining the relevant parcel because they are unlikely to
manipulate claims about economic expectations. David Lucas would appear to me to present
exactly the kind of strategic claim Fee believes unlikely. See Fee, supra note 16 at 1560.
Commentators have also warned against rules that allow for such strategic actions, especially in
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This apparent differential treatment has been the source of some criticism of
relevant parcel calculations, but only Richard Epstein seems willing to go to
the extreme and argue that the relevant parcel calculation is entirely
irrelevant, and that the denominator always should be the same as the
numerator 23 But Epstein aside, once we accept the propriety of doing a
relevant parcel calculation, the difficulty obviously lies in justifying any
denominator larger than the numerator. And while courts have said the
denominator issue must be addressed, they have offered very little
justification for that claim except that it would be unfair to the government




The Supreme Court has addressed the vertical severance question a
number of times and, not surprisingly, has been inconsistent in its
responses. The first case was Mahon,125 in which Justice Holmes found that
the Kohler Act destroyed the coal companies' support estates which made it
impossible for them to mine coal, even though mining would destroy the
surface estate.'2 6 The vertical separation of the fee into mineral, support, and
surface estates was deemed, by Justice Holmes, to be an acceptable way to
think about the consequences of the legislation. Even though the fee simple
estate was not destroyed by the Kohler Act, the restrictions on mining
essentially transferred the support estate to the surface owners, thus
rendering the mineral estates valueless. 127
Sixty-five years later, however, the Supreme Court refused to vertically
sever the fee estate in a nearly identical case: Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis (Keystone Bituminous).128 In that case, Justice Stevens
explained that the Court would not vertically sever the support estate
because it has no value separate and apart from either the mineral or surface
estates. As Justice Stevens explained:
[Olur takings jurisprudence forecloses reliance on such legalistic distinctions
within a bundle of property rights.... [I]n practical terms, the support estate
the horizontal severance context. See Margaret J. Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property:
Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Ta~ings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1677-78 (1988); Rose,
supra note 21, at 568; Case Comment, Constitutional Law-Regulatory Takngs-Federal
Circuit's Holding Introduces Subjective Factors into Talngs Clause "Denominator" Analyss
114 HARV. L. REV. 926 (2001).
123 See Richard Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of Takings Law: The Dissents in Lucas v. S.
Carolina Coastal Council, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 955 (1993); EPSTEIN, supra note 45.
124 "Land use regulations are ubiquitous and most of them impact property values in some
tangential way-often in completely unanticipated ways. Treating them all as per se takings
would transform government regulation into a luxury few governments could afford." Tahoe-
Sierra, 535 U.S. 302, 324 (2002).
125 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
126 Id. at 412-14.
127 Id at 414.
128 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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has value only insofar as it protects or enhances the value of the estate with
which it is associated. Its value is merely a part of the entire bundle of rights
possessed by the owner of either the coal or the surface.
129
No compensation was necessary in Keystone Bituminous when only
two percent of the coal was required to remain in place to prevent
subsidence of the surface. 130 The amount of coal, though valuable, was
believed to be minimal in comparison to the harm prevented and the amount
of coal that could still be removed.
13 1
Possessing value as a separate estate has not, however, served as the
rule of thumb for when vertical severance will be considered in other cases.
With regard to airspace rights, the Court first held that the airspace could be
severed off and taken when low-flying airplanes caused a destruction of a
chicken farmer's business in United States v. Causby,3 2 even though the
airspace itself had no apparent value. But, in 1979, when Penn Central
Transportation wanted to build its twenty-story office tower in the airspace
over Grand Central Station, the Court refused to consider the property rights
taken as just the airspace rights."3 Despite the predicted $100,000,000 value
of the office tower, 34 the Court found no taking because, when viewed in
terms of the aggregate value of the entire city tax block, the land still
retained value despite the historic landmark designation and the prohibition
of building in the airspace above the terminal. 1
Although limited vertical severance might seem to make some sense
with regard to traditionally recognized vertical estates (mineral, surface, and
airspace), the Court seems willing to slice up the fee for denominator
purposes if the remaining estate loses all value, and unwilling to slice it if it
retains value.1 6 Lower courts, however, seem to have taken a slightly
different approach to vertical segmentation: Where a landowner purchases
the entire fee simple estate and loses the right to mine, she likely has no
taking claim because the land retains value for timber, recreation, and
perhaps development. 137 But where a landowner purchases only the mineral
129 Id. at 500-01.
130 Id at 498.
131 This case too has a horizontal and a vertical component-horizontal when comparing two
percent of affected coal with all the coal, and vertical when comparing the effects on the
support, surface, and mineral estates.
132 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
133 Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
134 Id at 116 (50 year lease of $3 million per year rental less $1 million per year loss of
existing concessions).
135 Id at 138.
136 See Mark Lisker, Regulatory Takings and the Denominator Problem, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 663,
720-24 (1996) (taking the approach of limiting severance to only those separate and distinct
estates recognized under state law). We can perhaps distinguish Mahon and Penn Central by the
fact that, without the support estate, the coal companies could not exploit their mineral estates
at all. Thus, they faced total destruction of the value of the property rights they owned (they
only owned the support and mineral estates) by virtue of the "taking" of the support estate. In
Penn Central, however, the purported taking of the airspace left the landowner with a
continuing valuable estate, the surface use of the terminal.
137 Cane Tenn., Inc. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 100, 107-08 (2002); Cane Tenn., Inc. v.
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estate and is prohibited from mining by regulation, compensation may be
due because the landowner experiences a 100% economic loss.138 Other
courts have created different rules under state Takings Clauses, rules that
look at intent behind the purchase and the economics of comparing land
inside and outside regulated areas. 13
Vertical segmentation is also complicated when a landowner acquires
only mining rights, but to an area larger than what is regulated. Under
federal takings law, the courts have said the total viable mining rights are the
relevant parcel when only a portion are regulated. 4 ' But under Ohio law, for
instance, it is not clear that the courts would include mining rights outside
the regulated area in determining the relevant parcel.'4' Value and
reasonable investment-backed expectations clearly play a role in lower court
determinations of the relevant parcel, but in strange ways. One court says no
compensation is due from regulation of mineral lands because economic
value remains, 42 while another court requires compensation because
exploiting the minerals was the economic endeavor intended by the parties
and a mining company, presumably, should not have to move into the
ecotourism or development business to take advantage of land purchases. 143
One obvious problem with the vertical severance rule is it encourages
landowners to purchase only the bare minimum property they require for
their immediate needs. If a mining company has no takings claim to land
which it purchased in fee because the land could be sold for other uses,
while it has a takings claim if it only purchases mineral rights, there is an
incentive to rely on the Takings Clause as insurance for investments in
regulated activities. Without the Takings Clause insurance, a wise investor
would seem likely to maximize property interests so long as she can do so
efficiently. A mining company would not purchase fee interests in land if
United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 115 (2003) (holding that brochures advertising land ultimately
purchased in fee as having timber and recreational purposes proved the land had value beyond
the mining rights); Animas Valley, 38 P.3d 59, 61-62, 68 (Colo. 2001) (holding that land in which
eight acres were permitted for sand and gravel mining out of total of 42 acres retained value
when mining was denied for the remainder of the land).
138 Cane Tenn., 54 Fed. Cl. 100; Cane Tenn., 57 Fed. Cl. 115 (remanding for determination of
whether the second parcel had residual value when it contained only mining rights). Also, the
concurrence in Animas Valley stated that there should be no difference between landowners
who purchase the entire fee and those that purchase only the mineral rights; each should be
analyzed according to the economic impact alone. Animas Valley, 38 P.3d at 74 (Kourlis, J.
specially concurring). But see RTG, Inc. v. State, 780 N.E.2d 998, 1008-09 (Ohio 2002) (holding
that under Ohio law, mineral estate can be severed for takings purposes, even if the landowner
owns the full fee interests).
139 RTG, 780 N.E.2d at 1008 (stating that under the Takings Clause of the Ohio Constitution,
.coal rights are severable and may be considered as a separate property interest if the property
owner's intent was to purchase the property solely for the purpose of mining coal" (emphasis
added)).
140 Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. 470, 498-502 (1987); Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 54
Fed. Cl. 717, 723 (2002).
141 RTG, 780 N.E.2d at 1006-10.
142 Cane Tenn., 54 Fed. Cl. at 107-08; Cane Tenn., 57 Fed. Cl. at 129-31.
143 Of course, this ignores the possible value that could be reaped from sale of the land for
these purposes.
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doing so cost five or six times as much as merely purchasing the mineral
interests. But, if the fee interests only cost 20% more, and there are other
viable uses for the land like timber or recreation, it might be more efficient
to purchase the entire fee interest, even if doing so weakens potential
takings claims. Sensible takings rules should promote self-insuring, not
defeat it. This very tension is perfectly illustrated in Mahon, where
ownership of the full fee would have removed the company from liability
under the Kohler Act, thus eliminating the takings conflict altogether.14
Eighty years later, some of the lower court rules actually punish such a
company for self-insuring. This tension seems highly relevant in the creation
of any denominator rules and yet there has been no discussion of it in any of
the cases.
The problem becomes very apparent in considering what still remains
one of the most important takings cases of the century, Penn Central. What
if Penn Central Transportation had sold the surface estate (Grand Central
Station) to another business and retained only the airspace rights, perhaps
with a lease from the new owners for construction of the tower, before the
landmark designation? Would the fact that Penn Central only owned the
airspace and lease give it a stronger taking claim because without the
airspace its remaining lease no longer had value? What if, instead, Penn
Central had sold the airspace to another entity and its successor brought the
takings claim? From many of the Court's cases on vertical severance, we
could reasonably assume that the preregulation severance and change in
ownership would better position the landowner for a sympathetic takings
inquiry. But such rules should alert courts to look for strategic behavior
designed to set up a favorable takings claim.1 45
Ironically, preregulation severance is essentially what occurred in
Mahon. In that case, the Kohler Act prohibited the excavation of coal that
would cause subsidence of land under buildings, streets, and other
structures if the surface lands had been severed from the mineral estates.
The regulation explicitly applied only to those companies that had reduced
their holdings from fee simple absolute, to simply the mineral and support
estates. Justice Holmes, in holding that the coal companies' support estate
and underlying coal had been taken by the regulation and that compensation
was due, explained, "In general it is not plain that a man's misfortunes or
necessities will justify his shifting the damages to his neighbor's
shoulders." 4 ' Justice Holmes believed that the coal companies, who owned
both the mineral and the support estates, should not be forced to protect, at
their expense, the private property rights of third parties, the surface
owners. But this snapshot view of ownership overlooks the role of the coal
companies in making themselves subject to the regulation by severing the
144 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
145 This is the reasoning of Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), as well as BroadwaterFarms, 35 Fed.
Cl. 232 (1996), and Ciampitti, 22 Cl. Ct. 310 (1991).
146 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416. At the same time, is it plain that encouraging a man to pursue
profits justifies shifting external costs to his neighbor's shoulders?
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surface rights.'47 Had they not sold off the surface rights they would not have
been subject to the Act and the taxpayers would not have had to bail out
their frustrated expectations. 48 Similarly, if Penn Central Transportation
sold the surface terminal and retained only the airspace, it would have
participated in reducing its property rights to the barest minimum needed to
accomplish its goal of building an office tower. Any additional restraint after
the severance would make its retained property rights entirely worthless,
even though it was in a position, by not selling, to avoid all regulatory
harm. 1
49
But can we justify punishing a property owner who maximizes value by
selling those property rights that he does not need, retaining only what is
necessary for his current purpose (either horizontally or vertically)? The
coal companies in Mahon are perfect examples of wealth maximizers and
rational capitalists; because they wanted to maximize their profits by
exploiting both the mineral estates and the surface estates, they severed the
two, selling to private individuals just the surface rights under a contract
waiving the support rights.' My students insist that the surface owners
were on notice that they were not acquiring support rights, that they
contracted away such rights, and should not be able to renegotiate their
contracts through legislation. 5' But viewing the series of transactions not as
single, unrelated events, but as a continuously evolving interaction, we see
that the coal companies have, through their own voluntary actions, placed
themselves in a position that they are unable to exploit their own retained
property without causing harm to the property rights of the surface owners
which they created.'52
147 1 understand that an argument could be made that they had no idea their severance of the
surface would put them in such a vulnerable position, though in reality I question whether such
a claim would hold water when they are responsible in some way for guaranteeing the
enjoyment of the surface owners' estates. Any subdivider of land guarantees quiet enjoyment to
his grantees, whether that necessitates providing an easement, limiting his own activities, or
merely warranting title. See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY
281, 910 (3d ed. 2000).
148 Of course, in Mahon the taxpayers did not in fact have to bail out the coal companies
because the Act was rescinded, but that merely shifted the harm from the taxpayer to the
surface estate owners. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414-16.
149 This is an equitable version of "don't put all your eggs in one basket." Landowners who
sell off everything but the right to engage in a single use are not entirely without responsibility
for the harms they suffer when that single use is prohibited. In looking at the effects of
landowner's preregulation actions, it may be reasonable to analyze the foreseeability by
regulators of causing such detrimental impact, as well as the foreseeability by landowners that a
specific use may be curtailed.
150 It is critical to such an analysis that the mineral and surface estates cannot both be
enjoyed and exploited at the same time. Use of one necessarily destroys the other.
151 How can we distinguish, if at all, between the contract rights at issue in Mahon and the
contracts between bakers and bakery owners in Lochner, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)? And if we cannot,
then is it not reasonable to at least question our commitment to upholding these contracts?
152 It is as though the bakery owners in Lochner agreed to limit the number of bakeries in
operation so that they were now required to run for longer and longer hours, thus exposing
their workers to unhealthy working conditions. Then they cry foul when limits are imposed on
their ability to exploit fully their workers' labor.
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The Pennsylvania statute created an exception for coal mining
companies that still retained the surface estates; i.e., those that had self-
insured. They might destroy those estates because, in owning both, they
would assume the risk of exploiting one form of property (the coal) at the
expense of another form (the surface) and would best be able to choose
which was the more profitable in light of the fact that both could not
simultaneously be developed. Although Justice Holmes was convinced that
the coal companies lost their mineral and support estates by operation of the
statute and were thereby entitled to compensation, he failed to note the role
the companies played in creating the pickle in which they found themselves,
and the value they previously derived from selling the surface lands which
they then proceeded to undermine.
There is an important argument here, that I develop later, as to whether
the Takings Clause is designed to insure all landowners against risky
investments or protect against catastrophic losses.5 The business person
who purchases only the mineral rights or only the number of acres barely
sufficient to support her development may suffer significant loss if
regulations are enacted that preclude completion of her plans. On the other
hand, the wise and cautious investor anticipates change and might purchase
extra land or additional property rights to serve as a buffer in case the
original plans become impossible. Such hedging prevents total wipeouts and
is often wholly within a landowner's power. And while at one time
government policy may have been to encourage exploitation of resources at
all costs, in the highest and most extensive manner, which would call for a
rule encouraging people to maximize wealth by minimizing property rights,
times have changed. Land uses conflict, and landowners cannot reasonably
expect highest and best use." And that truth leaves the courts in the
inevitable quandary of determining the amount of self-insurance or
reduction in profit that the Constitution permits, or perhaps requires, be
imposed on all landowners.
Should the relevant parcel, therefore, be the property owned by the coal
company at the time of the regulation (the mineral and support estate), or
the property owned by the coal company before it severed the surface estate
and sold it to buyers who would be unable to use and develop their new
property if the coal company chose to use and develop its retained rights?
Preregulation severance, even if not done strategically to set up a Lucas-type
claim,155 certainly should be relevant in the case of Mahon because the
conveyance of the surface estate was for value, and it should be relevant for
153 See discussion infra Section VII.
154 See Euclid, 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (finding that landowners cannot expect unfettered right to
development and highest and best use); see also Colonil Land Use Law, supra note 23 (an
excellent article on the history of Takings Clause jurisprudence and the extensive regulations
and limitations on land use that existed well into the nineteenth century).
155 The fear raised after Lucas was that landowners would sever their property rights into
such narrow sticks that the regulation would then be held to have taken 100% of the value of
that narrow stick. See Radin, supra note 122.
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all landowners who can take minimal steps to insure against regulatory
change.
1 6
Failing to look back at a landowner's choices to sell or develop excess
property, or failure to buy sufficient buffer rights when available, artificially
constricts a court's view of the decisions a landowner makes over time to
use and enjoy the benefits of his property. I do not criticize Pennsylvania
Coal's decision to sell off its unneeded surface rights. But I do suggest that
such an action is relevant in the denominator calculation because a special
relationship and a duty were created by the coal company's actions. And it is
certainly relevant that the Kohler Act essentially protected the interests of
grantees of the coal companies, not simply the public at large. Failing to take
account of these voluntary actions effectively creates a constitutional right
to be a wealth maximizer.
C Functional Severance
The denominator problem also arises in a more abstract form that I call
functional severance, and which Margaret Jane Radin has termed conceptual
severance. 5 7 Rather than focus on the physical acreage affected by a
regulation or the vertical estates, some landowners have tried to narrowly
identify the property right that is affected in a way that implies a 100%
taking." This has worked in certain cases and not in others. For instance,
156 One could perhaps also argue for a different outcome based on the question of
unconscionability of the contract term whereby the surface owners purportedly agreed to
purchase a surface estate without a support estate. Perhaps they knowingly took the risk, paid
significantly less for the surface estate than they would have paid had they also acquired the
support estate, and perhaps they had other options and could have purchased land nearby in fee
simple absolute, or at least surface rights that would not be undermined. Even assuming the
surface buyers understood that they were acquiring property rights that were at risk of
destruction, should we protect the coal companies' ability to sever their property rights in such
a way as to impose such a risk on their own grantees? Ironically, there are many property rights
we do not allow parties to contract around, such as the warranties of habitability and quiet
enjoyment. Although some commentators argue against such paternalistic interference with the
economic marketplace, courts do not seem inclined any time soon to ignore imbalances in
bargaining power and terms that shift the risk of harm to those least able to protect against it.
See generally Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Patemalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law,
with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563
(1982).
157 Radin, supra note 122. Radin explains conceptual severance as:
delineating a property interesting consisting of just what the government action has
removed from the owner, and then asserting that that particular whole thing has been
permanently taken. Thus, this strategy hypothetically or conceptually "severs" from the
whole bundle of rights just those strands that are interfered with by the regulation, and
then hypothetically or conceptually construes those strands in the aggregate as a
separate whole thing.
Id at 1676.
158 Mark Lisker suggests a rule that would have the courts start with the landowner's
definition of the denominator and only move off that definition if it is patently unreasonable. He
seems satisfied that landowners will not overreach because they want to maintain some
credibility with the court. See Lisker, supra note 10, at 720. But given the claims of plaintiffs in
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rather than think of the physical 1% to 2% of land that would escheat under
the Indian Land Consolidation Act, the Court in Hodel identified the rights to
descent and devise as two core sticks in the bundle of rights, the destruction
of which constituted a compensable taking.159 By separating out the rights of
descent and devise, even though rights of inter vivos transfer remained, the
Court conceived of the regulation as entirely destroying two core property
rights. 60
There is a distinction to be made between Radin's notion of conceptual
severance, which includes any effort to narrow the description of the
property right to only those portions of property, either horizontal, vertical,
functional, or temporal, that is negatively affected, and the functional
severance I am talking about here. The former is essentially any interest less
than the fee, or perhaps a leasehold, and is usually defined by landowners as
whatever the precluded uses or restricted interests might be. The latter is a
subset of the former, consisting primarily of legally cognizable rights, like
the rights to exclude, alienate, and possess, as well as the rights to develop
and use, which are often hampered by regulations. According to Radin,
conceptual severance was resisted in Penn Central when the Court refused
to vertically sever the fee and allowed in Hodel where the severance of
rights to devise and descent demanded compensation. For sheer logic and
symmetry, I use the term functional severance to pull out those situations
that are not severances in physical space (horizontal or vertical) 6' or time,
but are attempts to define property rights by function, either as sticks in the
bundle, or as even smaller, function-specific use rights.
Functional severance is a logical response to the twentieth century
trend in viewing property as a bundle of legal rights, not the physical thing
itself,6 ' and Mahon is one of the cases that began the shift. Simply
recognizing that a regulation can destroy core attributes of property without
necessitating physical invasion or appropriation of ownership marks
regulatory takings doctrine as leading the charge toward functional
Loveladies, Palm Beach Isles, Broadwater Farms, and Ciampitt, I wonder how realistic his view
of the reasonableness of landowners in fact is. Lisker does, however, note the possibility of
rewarding strategic behavior by a rule that blindly permits the landowner to sever and retain the
least valuable portion of his land. Id at 723.
159 Hodel, 481 U.S. 704, 717-18 (1987).
160 Justice O'Connor explained that "the character of the Governmental regulation here is
extraordinary.... Moreover, this statute effectively abolishes both descent and devise of these
property interests even when the passing of the property to the heir might result in
consolidation of property .... [A] total abrogation of these rights cannot be upheld." Id at 716-
17 (emphasis removed).
161 I distinguish vertical severance from functional severance because of the legal
acceptance of the estates of airspace, support, and mineral rights. We routinely transfer such
physical estates, while we often use servitudes to limit more indistinct rights like development
rights. Servitudes can be infinitely adaptable and malleable to define very limited uses or very
broad uses and are accordingly less defined and more difficult to value in inverse condemnation
claims. As such, severance by landowners in ways that are limited to specific uses fits a narrow
definition of functional severance, rather than the broader notion of Radin's conceptual
severance.
162 See JOSEPH SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 2-3 (2001); HOHFELD, supra note 53, at
23-24; STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 147, at 3-7.
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severance of property. In an extreme form, functional severance encourages
us to think of a regulation prohibiting the building of a nuclear power plant
on a fault line as a total taking of the property right to build a nuclear power
plant, even though all other uses are permitted and no ownership or
possessory rights are taken. 16 A particularly extreme example of functional
severance was the claim by Exxon that a taking occurred when the Valdez
was allowed to travel anywhere in the world except Prince William Sound."
The idea that compensation should be paid for a taking of the right to enter
Prince William Sound, despite the regulation's minimal effect on the value of
the ship, would be soundly rejected by most courts. However, those same
courts would turn around and compensate for the taking of the right to
descent and devise fractional interests in property that constitute less than
two percent of the total fee.
Functional severance has been difficult for the Court to contain
because of the modem trend of breaking down the effects of a governmental
regulation on land use by focusing on the individual property rights affected,
rather than on the physical object. Thus, interference with the right to
exclude,165 the right to descent and devise, 16 6 the right to possession, 167 and
the right to use a particular space on one's building" have been held to be
takings of those particular sticks in the bundle. Consequently, a landowner
who can frame the effects of a regulation in terms of a total taking of a core
stick may be moderately successful, despite the fact that all the other core
sticks, including ownership and possession, remain unaffected. While the
Court has attempted to stem this trend by protecting only core property
rights when they are completely destroyed, it has generally been
unsuccessful. The Court required compensation when the only right taken
was the right to exclude cable television boxes even though the right to
exclude all other persons and things remained unaffected. 169 Compensation
was also required when the property right taken was the right to exclude
lateral beach users from a narrow strip of beachfront land even though they
were excluded from the rest of the petitioner's land.170 At the same time, the
Court apparently did not view the right to alienate eagle feathers for value to
be a core stick even though virtually all economic value was destroyed, nor
the right to exclude war protestors from privately owned shopping malls.
171
163 San Diego Gas & Elec. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 626 n.6 (1981) (claiming
deprivation of beneficial use when industrial property was rezoned for open space and no
longer suitable for a nuclear power plant).
164 See, e.g., Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 790, 801 (1998) (as another egregious
taldngs claim, finding a taldng when regulations required single hull barges to be retrofitted
with a double hull).
165 KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979).
166 Hodel, 481 U.S. 704, 718 (1987).
167 United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115 (1951); United States v. Petty Motor
Co., 327 U.S. 372, 378 (1946); United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 383-84 (1945).
168 Loretto, 458 U.S. 419, 441-42 (1982).
169 Id.
170 Nolla.n, 483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987).
171 Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51
(1979). At some point, however, one must give up the illusion that consistency or coherence will
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If the Court wants to base takings jurisprudence on the bundle of rights,
and award compensation whenever a core stick (the right to alienate,
possess, exclude, or use) is taken, it would find support for such severance
in traditional property law.172 But line-drawing, even with core sticks, has
proven to be nearly impossible. Should the courts protect the right to
exclude everyone, 73 but not the right to exclude certain people, 174 or should
they protect the right to use and develop when regulations bar all forms of
development, 175 or just certain types of development, like mining? 17 Not
surprisingly, the Court has rejected some regulation-specific severance of
the bundle (the right to build a power plant on a fault line) 77, but not all (the
right to exclude cable television boxes)"8 , and it refuses to even see the
functional severance in others (the right to use as an office building and not
as a railroad terminal) 79. Functional severance is quite incoherent when we
consider that all regulations affecting uses of property will more or less
affect a core stick and that there is no feasible way to prevent sliding down
the slippery slope toward recognition of all regulation-specific severances.
While trying to cabin the trend of landowners arguing for functional
severance, the Court has still been receptive to arguments claiming a
combination of core rights and economic value.8" In that way, regulations
that interfere with specific property rights and that also drastically affect
economic value may be evaluated through functional severance, but not
regulations that leave some economic value. Thus, when value is tied to a
single use, and that use is prohibited, the Court seems willing to consider
functional severance, but not when economic value remains through other
uses.' When David Lucas was prohibited from building a residence on his
emerge from the Court's jurisprudence. See generallyKanner, supra note 43.
172 SINGER, supra note 162, at 3-4.
173 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (finding the government cannot take the "right
to exclude" without paying compensation).
174 Pruneyard Shopping Ctr, 447 U.S. at 84 (ruling that in a shopping center, the right to
exclude war protesters was not "so essential to the use or economic value of the property that
the state-authorized limitation of it amounted to a taking").
175 Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (granting compensation when "all economically
productive or beneficial uses of land" are off limits).
176 Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. 470, 471 (1987) (ruling that law restricting mining in the
interest of public health does not constitute a taking).
177 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
178 Loretto, 458 U.S. 419, 441, 438 n.16 (1982) (awarding compensation for state-required
permanent physical occupation of 1.5 cubic feet of Loretto's property by a cable television
installation).
179 Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (denying compensation for restrictions on
modifications of Grand Central Station mandated by New York City's Landmark Preservation
Law).
180 Of course, this was not followed in Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), see supra note
171 and accompanying text, or Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), see supra note 115 and
accompanying text, though it was in Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, see iofra note 182 and accompanying
text.
181 In Lucas, all economic value of the regulated land was arguably tied to residential
development. 505 U.S. at 1006. In Andrus, the Court allowed that despite prohibitions on the
sale of eagle feathers, some value remained because the eagle feathers could be displayed in a
museum and admission could be charged. 444 U.S. at 51, 66-67. The dissent in Andrus did not
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two beachfront lots, all that was taken was the right to build two houses. 182
He still retained the rights to alienate, devise, use, possess, and exclude. He
could plant a garden, camp out in a tent, build a fence around the lot, and
will it to his children. Yet the Court held that because economic value was
tied to this particular use, its prohibition constituted a categorical taking.183
The closest semblance of a rule is that destruction of core sticks (regardless
of value) or particularly valuable (semi-core) sticks may require
compensation. But the Court's supposed rejection of vertical severance
while accepting certain types of functional severance cannot be reconciled
easily, especially when the difference seems to lie in relying on economic
value.
If courts are looking for bright-line rules, they are only making the
situation worse when they tie functional severance to economic value. The
series of decisions in the four cases involving Florida Rock Industries"s
illustrates the way in which functional severance runs into trouble when
economic value is factored into the equation, because economic value is a
factor that is perhaps even more dynamic than the rights to use and develop.
Economic value is affected by actions over time, especially actions
occurring before the value is negatively affected by a regulation. In this case,
Florida Rock owned 1,560 acres of land in south Florida that was well
situated for mining limestone. At the time of purchase in 1972, the land was
zoned to allow mining and no other state or federal laws restricted the
landowners from mining any of the 1,560 acres. In late 1972, however,
amendments to the Clean Water Act were passed that required a dredge and
fill permit from the Army Corps of Engineers for the type of rock mining
anticipated for this land.l8 ' Florida Rock sought a permit in 1980 to mine
only 98 acres, which was denied. While limerock mining was prohibited, no
other use or ownership interests were restricted.
In 1985 (Florida Rock 1), Judge Kozinski of the United States Claims
Court found that the 98 acres were taken, and that the federal government
owed compensation, but he declined to address whether the remaining 1,462
acres for which no permit had been requested were also taken.8 6 On appeal,
in 1986 (Florida Rock II), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
reversed and remanded, stating, among other points, that it would not imply
a taking of the remaining 1,462 acres from the purported taking of the 98
think adequate value remained, just as the dissent in Lucas did not believe all value had been
destroyed. Brief for Appellees at 31-32, Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (No. 78-740); Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1036.
182 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006.
183 Id. at 1030.
184 Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States (Florida Rock 1), 8 Cl. Ct. 160 (1985); Fla. Rock
Indus., Inc. v. United States (Florida Rock i), 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Fla. Rock Indus.,
Inc. v. United States (Florida Rock II), 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990); Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United
States (Flolida Rock IV), 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
185 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000) ("The Secretary [of the Army, acting through the Chief of
Engineers,] may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public hearings for the
discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites.").
186 Forida Rock, 8 Cl. Ct. at 179.
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acres. 187 The court was also quite skeptical of the claim that the denial of a
permit to mine 98 acres rendered the remaining 1,462 acres valueless, or
even the 98 acres valueless, even if the likelihood of being granted a permit
to mine the remaining land was nil."s Upon remand (Florida Rock III), the
Claims Court valued the 98 acres solely in terms of their ability to produce
income through rock mining, accepting the plaintiff's claims that no other
viable economic use could be made of this land. 8 9 But upon a second appeal
(Florida Rock IV), the case was remanded for further determinations of the
value of the 98 acres after imposition of the 1972 Clean Water Act
amendments 9 ° because it was unclear whether the decline in economic
value could be accurately attributed to the regulation. 91 The majority noted
that if the decline in value was 95%, a taking would be likely, but not if it was
closer to 50%, 192 a fact that required greater sophistication in weighing the
elements of market value to determine if the entire decline was due to the
regulation, or if reasonable speculators with long-term plans might still pay a
substantial price for regulated property. 1 3
The dispute between the majority and dissent in Florida Rock IVis a
good example of the functional severance problem in calculating the
relevant parcel. The regulation arguably only prohibited one type of use,
limerock mining, which was admittedly the highest and best use of the land
at the time. The majority insisted that compensation can be required for a
mere diminution in value when it goes far enough as to look like a partial
taking of the fee (whatever that means),'19 4 which suggested that value is
somehow a property right that, when taken, should be compensated (at least
when enough value is taken, even if it is less than 100%).195 The dissent
argued that there is no taking unless one can show a total taking of a
187 Florida Rockl, 791 F.2d at 906.
188 Id. at 901-02. The court took note of the fact that because the land was located near
Miami, it might have other investment value. Id. at 902.
189 Florida Rock II, 21 Ci. Ct. at 176.
19 Florida Rock IV, 18 F.3d at 1564-65. This decision also came after the Supreme Court's
important opinion in Lucas; 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
191 Florida RockV, 18 F.3d at 1565.
192 The majority in Florida Rock IVwas grappling with the fairness issue raised in footnote
seven of Lucas, namely that 100% economic loss created a categorical obligation to compensate
while 99% economic loss or less would be evaluated under ad hoc balancing which, even at the
high end, did not guarantee compensation. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 n.7. Eucid, 272 U.S. 365
(1926) is the problem case in which the Court has said that 75% reduction in economic value is
fine if there is sufficient public benefit behind a regulation. Id at 384-85. Reconciling Euclid and
Lucas in purely mathematical terms is difficult, though under ad hoc balancing it becomes much
easier because the court can consider numerous factors besides decline in economic value.
193 Both the majority and dissent agreed that Penn Central was the proper test because the
regulation did not cause 100% economic loss for the value of the entire 98 acres for all uses, but
the majority would treat the loss in value as the property right taken and use it as a measure of
compensation. Florida Rock IV, 18 F.3d at 1569-71. The dissent, on the other hand, would
incorporate the loss of economic value into the calculation of whether a taking even occurred,
so that relatively low percentages of lost value would likely preclude a finding that a taking
occurred in the first place. Id at 1578.
194 Is it a partial taking of the fee or a taking of a partial fee?
195 Forida Rock IV 18 F.3d at 1569.
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traditional severable interest, like the mineral rights, or an easement, or the
entire fee.196 If a total taking of a severable interest occurs, then a legally
recognizable property right is to be conveyed to the government upon
payment of compensation. If the property interests taken are virtually all the
sticks in the bundle, then the fee is to be conveyed upon payment. But the
dissent correctly noted that if we cannot identify a severable property right
to be conveyed, mere diminution in value should not be enough to support a
takings claim, because value alone is not an independent property right, and
upon compensation there would be nothing to convey to the government.
197
The functional severance problem here is more complicated than
whether economic value is a stick, the taking of which requires
compensation, or is instead merely a factor in determining whether a taking
has in fact occurred.' 9 When we consider how economic value fluctuates
over time as regulations come and go, developments occur, cities expand,
and speculating landowners act strategically to maximize their profits,
economic value can be a very unsteady variable indeed.199 One issue raised
in Florida Rock IV was whether the decline in value could be entirely
attributed to the regulation, or whether a robust market in land speculators
willing to acquire heavily regulated land would vitiate the claims of
economic loss. But both dissent and majority viewed economic value as a
static determination based on the presence or absence of a viable real estate
market in similarly situated regulated land. They did not, on the other hand,
consider what prior actions of the landowner, whether in anticipation of the
regulation or not, may have influenced the decline in market value as much
as, or perhaps more than, the regulation. Nor did they consider possible
future changes in land use that might make the land particularly valuable,
especially in population-rich south Florida. Subsequent legislation that
allows developers to buy and protect wetlands to compensate for filling in
other areas may create market value for this land that would otherwise not
exist.
Moving beyond a one-time determination of market value at the
regulatory moment and taking account of landowner actions more
accurately represents the complex variety of factors that affect market
value, but it also makes line-drawing nearly impossible. Consider, for
example, a landowner who develops and sells four out of five phases of a
residential subdivision located around a public lake, and is denied a section
404 permit to fill half the lands of the fifth phase. This landowner has acted
in numerous ways that affected the market value of the remaining land. The
development of the first four phases most certainly raised the value of the
remaining fifth-phase lands, so there is some value added to Phase Five
196 Id at 1576.
197 Id
198 Because economic impact is one prong of Penn Central balancing, the dissent argues that
impact is relevant, but it cannot be a determining factor in the taking and the quantum of
property at the same time. Id at 1577.
199 See, e.g, William Wade, Economic Backbone of the Penn Central TestAfter Florida Rock
V, K&K, and Palazzolo, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11,221 (2002) (showing the obvious
complexities of identifying the economic impact of a regulation).
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lands beyond whatever was made on the sales of lots in the other four
phases from their development. He may have promised to build a marina, a
golf club, or a grocery store on the Phase Five lands, a promise that yielded
higher returns on the homes sold in the first four phases, and which
consequently raised the value of the retained land. At the same time, he may
have installed drainage systems in the four phases that increased the surface
water on the remaining phase, thus bringing Phase Five lands under the
aegis of the Corps, and perhaps lowering its market value. It is not
farfetched to imagine that development of the first four phases caused native
wildlife to relocate to, or increase the population of endangered species on,
the remaining parcel in ways that may have affected market value or
increased the Phase Five lands' susceptibility to regulation. Not only
because it cannot be filled, but because of endangered species on the land,
the landowner may not be able to build any structures at all, though without
the first four phases he might have been allowed to develop that land.
Should we consider market value, and hence the property right taken by a
section 404 denial, only in terms of the effects on market value at the time
the permit is denied? Or, should market value be irrelevant in the takings
calculation and only relevant in determining the amount of compensation
due once a taking has been determined to exist? Or, as I suggest later,
should the relevant parcel calculation allow for the consideration of market
value without skewing the calculation in favor of large landowners by
considering prior actions that both raise and lower market value?
Market value is directly tied to the presence or absence of regulations.
For instance, the size and scope of the first four phases of our five-phase
development may have been so extensive that the county decided to impose
a moratorium on further construction in that area because of damage to the
lake from runoff of surface waters, or because the Phase Five lands need to
remain wetlands to protect the town's water supply. The developer's
preregulatory activities not only may have elevated the initial property
values, but they also may have caused the regulations to work particularly
harshly on the retained land so that the diminution in value caused by the
regulations were exacerbated by the landowner's prior development. Is it
fair to attribute the loss in value entirely to the regulations, or has the
landowner participated, in some crucial degree, in the overall interaction of
the regulatory and economic marketplace, so that it is fair to offset certain
legitimate preregulatory increases in market value against the diminution
purportedly caused by the regulation?
At one level, the answer is most certainly yes with regard to big players
in the market, and one obvious critique is that big repeat players that can
influence market value might be treated differently than small players in the
takings analysis.2" It is also a valid critique that if we take such actions into
account, we may not know when to stop, or how far back to go in evaluating
the effects of a landowner's preregulation activities. If the English had not
occupied this soil, there would have been no revolution, no United States
200 That is exactly the gist of most of John Fee's arguments in Unearthing the Denominator
in Regulatory Taking Claims. Fee, supra note 16.
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government, and consequently no Army Corps of Engineers to deny a
section 404 permit. The slippery slope rears its head again. But there are
natural endpoints, endpoints that can be determined by a principled theory
analyzing a landowner's actions against the harm caused by the regulation.
The functional severance problem cannot be coherently solved without
some attention to the prior severing that created the disparate and
conflicting interests that exist in the first place, and which are balanced and
protected by regulations. To the extent economic value has infiltrated the
functional severance analysis, a landowner's actions simply cannot be
evaluated at the single point in time when a regulation goes into effect.
Individual sticks in the bundle rise and fall in economic value over time, not
only in response to regulation, but also in response to numerous actions by a
landowner as well as by his neighbors. Unpacking that relationship, while
not easy, needs to be done in order to ascertain fairly the true effect of a
regulation on a severable property right and the value of that property." 1
D. Temporal Severance
The issue of temporal severance is particularly confusing, even for
experienced and talented takings lawyers and judges. In traditional takings
jurisprudence, temporal severance is the taking of a temporal slice of the
property pie over time. An obvious example of temporal severance is the
division of ownership over time with the use of future interests. A fee simple
determinable followed by a possibility of reverter in the grantor is a clear
division of fee ownership over time, as is a life estate followed by a
remainder. Similarly, the granting of a leasehold for a particular term of
years results in a temporal division in the right to possession. Courts have
routinely held that destruction of a vested future interest through regulation
is a taking that requires compensation while destruction of a contingent
future interest does not.2"2 Similarly, a leasehold for a specific period of
201 It is very important to settle the role of value in functional severance because landowners
legitimately need to be able to argue that the only viable use of a particular parcel of land has
been denied by a regulation restricting a single use when in fact there is no reasonable
alternative use. Clearly, denial of a right to mine may destroy the value of a mineral estate, but it
is not clear that a denial of a right to mine destroys the value of any fee interest in land. At the
same time despite Justice Blackmun's skepticism in Lucas, the rights to camp, take walks on,
devise, and exclude from beachfront land has little economic value without the right to build a
house. See Lucas, 505 U.S 1003 (1992).
202 For example, marketable title acts, as well as the rule against perpetuities, cause the
termination of contingent future interests and do not raise takings implications because the
property rights are deemed to be inchoate and, therefore, not fully fledged property rights
warranting constitutional protection. Marketable title acts generally extinguish contingent
remainders, executory interests, possibilities of reverter, and other contingent future interests
that have burdened property for a period of time, such as forty or fifty years, unless the holder
takes steps to preserve his or her interest by rerecording the interest in the public records. See
ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 855-58 (2d ed. 1993); Jay M. Zitter,
Annotation, Construction and Effect of "Marketable Record Title" Statutes, 31 A.L.R.4th 11
(1984). Marketable title acts have been deemed constitutional in most states as not working a
taking of private property rights. Wayne F. Foster, Annotation, Vaidity of Statute Canceling,
Destroying, Nullifyng, or Limiting Enforcement of Possibilities of Reverter or Rights of Re-
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time, which is a present possessory interest, cannot be taken without
compensation because it is a vested property right even if it is of limited
duration. 2
0 3
The Supreme Court ordered compensation in a number of leasehold
cases that arose out of wartime occupation of certain industries by
recognizing that a temporal slice of the fee can be appropriated. 204 And the
most recent takings case, Tahoe-Sierra, affirmed the correctness of those
cases. The leasehold cases, however, also involved physical invasion
because future interests and leaseholds are principally defined in terms of a
right to possession. Thus, it is not entirely clear if compensation was
required because a temporal property right was taken (the leasehold for a
specific period of time) or because of the physical invasion (the right to
possession). And not surprisingly, lawyers have argued both-that temporal
severance is proper in the takings calculation and that no severance is
necessary when there is physical invasion.
20 5
So long as we stick to traditional temporal sticks, like present
possessory rights and vested future interests, temporal severance is really no
different than functional severance. Just as the right to descent and devise is
a core stick, so too is a vested remainder. It may even be the case that
temporal sticks are more easily protected than, say, the isolated rights to
descent and devise, possess, use, or develop, which are relatively new in our
thinking about property, because of our long history of common law rules
creating future interests.206 And the Court has had little difficulty accepting
temporal severance with legally distinct temporal property rights, like
leaseholds and future interests. It has had more difficulty, however,
articulating a coherent rule when a regulation places a temporary restriction
on less traditional rights, like the rights to use and develop.
Fortunately, in 2002 the Court settled some of the uncertainty in Tahoe-
Siea 2 °7 At issue in Tahoe-Sierra were two building moratoria adding up to
Entry for Con diton Broken, 87 A.L.R.3d 1011 (1978). But not all marketable title acts have been
held constitutional. In fact, if they do not provide the property owner with an adequate
opportunity to protect her rights, they have been held to violate due process protections of
property. See Biltmore Village v. Royal, 71 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1954); Bd. of Educ. v. Miles, 15
N.Y.2d 364 (N.Y. 1965). Generally, however, a one- to two-year period in which to record one's
interests is considered adequate to meet due process requirements. See Presbytery of S.E. Iowa
v. Harris, 226 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa 1975) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975); Cline v. Johnson County
Bd. of Educ., 548 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. 1977). Currently, 21 states have these acts. They are:
California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah,
Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The Supreme Court has held that a mere expectation is not
property for takings purposes. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
203 United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 374-75 (1946); United States v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 381 (1945).
204 United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 117 (1951); Gen. Motors, 323 U.S. at 381.
205 The majority in Tahoe-SierFa held that no severance is at issue when there is physical
invasion, while the dissent argued that a temporal slice had been taken. 535 U.S. 302, 318-320,
355 (2002).
206 These are not new activities, just new in terms of severable property rights in the bundle.
See HOHFELD, supra note 53; Radin, supra note 122.
207 535 U.S. at 319-20.
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32 months that prohibited all use and development of certain lands around
Lake Tahoe. The critical question before the Court was whether a 32-month
temporal slice could be taken out of the endless life of a fee simple
absolute.20 Although the plaintiffs in Tahoe-Sierr argued that the 32-month
moratoria were a "temporary taking" under First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Glendale (First Engish),20 9 the Court
disagreed, finally explaining the difference between a temporary taking and
a taking of a temporal slice of the fee.21°
The issue in First English was whether compensation would be due for
the effect of a regulation that works a taking between the time the regulation
goes into effect and the time it is rescinded.21' Although termed a "temporary
taking," First English was substantially about whether rescission of an
overbroad regulation would remove liability for compensation, or whether
payment must be made for the period in which the regulation was in effect,
even if it is ultimately rescinded. 12 In requiring that compensation be due,
the Court was not dividing the property rights into temporal segments, but
rather forcing governments to partially compensate when they choose to
rescind overzealous regulation rather than pay for a taking of the fee.2 13
The Court in Tahoe-Sierra on the other hand, held that specific
temporal moratoria are not temporary takings because they are designed to
affect land only for a short period of time.21a Thus, a temporary taking is not
the same as the taking of a temporal right. The Court rejected in Tahoe-
Sierra the idea that temporary restrictions on development could be a taking
because, by definition, a temporary restriction affects only a small portion of
the endless life of the fee .21 The Court limited temporal severance to the
taking of a traditional temporal slice, like a leasehold, and did not extend the
temporal severance doctrine to include temporary restrictions in just any
use or property right.216
But in rejecting First English and acknowledging that the wartime
leasehold cases were primarily about physical invasion, the Court in Tahoe-
Sierra left open the question of when temporary regulations would no longer
208 Id. at 318.
209 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987).
210 Tahoe-Sier, 535 U.S. at 335-36. Although the difference was clear to anyone who read
the cases carefully, dicta in FirstEnglish, as well as imprecise descriptions in lower court cases,
have raised the possibility that any restriction of a temporary character could be characterized
a temporary taking.
211 The Court had been faced four times with the issue of whether a state, particularly
California, could require that any regulation held to work a taking required rescission of the law
rather than compensation. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986);
Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n. v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson, 473 U.S. 172 (1985);
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Not
until First English did the Court actually answer the question in the negative; even if a state
chose to rescind a law that otherwise worked a taking, compensation would still be due. First
English, 482 U.S. at 306-07.
212 First English, 482 U.S. at 310.
213 Id. at 319.
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be deemed a "normal delay" in the development and permitting process, but
would become compensable because they go too far. For relevant parcel
purposes, the Court has left open the possibility that certain temporal slices,
smaller than traditional leaseholds or future interests, can be cut out of the
property bundle and require compensation. Normal delays cannot be
severed, but presumably abnormal delays, especially bad-faith governmental
stalling tactics like the kind arguably present in cases like City of Monterey
v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,21 7 may cause a temporal severance of
a compensable piece of the fee. Even assuming the Court is serious about
rejecting efforts to temporally divide the fee except in those traditional cases
of future interests and leaseholds, however, the temporal severance problem
still raises philosophical difficulties with regard to preregulation landowner
actions.
Besides the obvious strategic temporal severance a landowner might do
in creating future interests that are likely to be cut down by regulation, just
as Pennsylvania Coal severed out the surface estate and made itself
vulnerable to regulation, a landowner's preregulation activities may cause
significant temporary harms that might decrease market value of land in the
short term but perhaps not in the long term."'8 For instance, a real estate
developer might enter into short-term contracts which are then breached
because of normal permitting delays. Or, a developer might buy purchase
options that, if exercised quickly, will result in tremendous cost savings, but
if delayed will result in losses. Such actions can have both short-term costs
and short-term gains that might be unduly affected by temporary regulations
such as the moratoria at issue in Tahoe-Sierra
To the extent the Court uses market value as a factor in identifying the
takings denominator, preregulation actions by the landowner that have high
short-term costs and low long-term costs might push a landowner's case
over the edge, from a regulation that would normally have minimal impact
on a landowner, to a regulation that goes too far and requires compensation
even though it is of temporary duration.219 This instability in takings law
217 526 U.S. 687 (1999). See also Mitchell v. Kemp, 575 N.Y.S.2d 337 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
(holding that a five year moratorium was unconstitutional); QC Constr. Co. v. Gallo, 649 F.
Supp. 1331, 1338 (D.R.I. 1986) (requiring compensation when moratorium on building permits
was based on incompetence in developing sewer infrastructure); Robert H. Freilich, Time,
Space, and Value in Inverse Condemnation: A Unified Theory for Partial Takings Analysis, 24 U.
HAW. L. REV. 589 (2002).
218 Steven Eagle acknowledges that any bright-line rule will not adequately account for
strategic behavior of landowners in transferring ownership in ways that take advantage of
taldngs rules. Eagle, supra note 10, at 10,130-31. John Echeverria also notes that "concern about
windfalls is inextricably linked with the property as a whole rule" and he identifies this as a
form of strategic behavior by landowners who manufacture takings claims. See John
Echeverria, supra note 10, at 11,119.
219 While I advocate a dynamic theory of property that would take account of preregulation
activities, I do not want to be misunderstood as ignoring the very real threat of governmental
bad faith. While I caution against landowners who act strategically to increase their takings
claims, I do not want to neglect the possibility of government regulators who do the same thing.
These are particularly problematic in the context of temporary regulations. But governmental
bad faith, I believe, is best handled by a more robust Due Process Clause, which can weed out
illegitimate regulatory behavior. Michael Wolf has an intriguing theory about using the Equal
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could prove shaky indeed, unless the courts adopt a rule that evaluates
landowner actions in a more comprehensive manner to include
preregulatory gains as well as reasonable risks assumed with land
speculation.
It is important that the Court has finally clarified what is meant by a
temporary taking and that it definitely is not a temporary regulation that, if
permanent, would require compensation. Rather, it is a permanent taking
that, if cut short, still requires compensation. But clarifying the limits of First
English did not help address the underlying issue of when a regulation that
has temporary effects moves from being a mere normal delay in
development to going too far. To the extent the Court allows temporal
severance only for traditional rights like leaseholds and future interests, any
other temporary regulation would undergo Penn Central balancing and
would likely survive because any time period is necessarily less than the
infinite duration of a fee simple absolute. This will be unsatisfying to some
because by definition there will be no case that can go too far because a
temporary regulation will always be offset by a denominator of infinity. But
if, instead, the Court wants to start from the other end and address when a
"normal delay" becomes compensable,2 2 ° it is likely to have a hard time
drawing lines. It will inevitably run right into the same line-drawing problem
we have seen with the other severance issues: namely, what is the relevant
parcel in time that should serve as the denominator if the infinitude of fee
simple absolute is always too big?
Despite protestations from the Court that it adheres to the "parcel-as-a-
whole" rule for physical, functional, and temporal property rights,
governmental entities are generally insecure about the Court's commitment
to such a position. And this insecurity stems not only from a question about
the Court's commitment, but from a theoretical uncertainty as to whether
the position can be maintained. For how does one distinguish in a principled
way between a regulation that affects one acre out of ten, which the Court
finds is not compensable,221 or one acre out of one, which it finds is
compensable?22 2 How do state actors know that a right to descent and devise
is a core property right,22 3 but a right to sell eagle feathers is not,2 24 or that a
moratorium on building is no longer a normal delay in permitting but has
become a taking of a temporal interest?225 The difficulty in identifying the
relevant parcel for denominator purposes is not new and has plagued the
Protection Clause in bad faith cases, which was used successfully for a class of one by a
landowner claiming local government was out to "get" her. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech,
528 U.S. 562, 563-65 (2000) (stating that the allegations were "sufficient to state a claim for
relief under traditional equal protection analysis"). Strategic behavior by landowners, however,
can be guarded against only by a robust theory of the relevant parcel.
220 See Tahoe-Siera, 535 U.S. at 351-52, 354 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (focusing on the
duration of the moratorium to determine if the taking is compensable).
221 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
222 Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 (2002).
223 Hodel, 481 U.S. 704, 717-18 (1986).
224 Andrus v. Alard, 444 U.S. 51, 64 (1979).
225 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335-36 (a claim that a regulation has caused a temporary
taling requires an examination of all relevant factors and circumstances).
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Court since 1922. And the wholly unsatisfactory answer that a taking of 100%
of the relevant property must be compensated, but that anything less
requires Penn Central balancing, does not help because under Penn Central
balancing the Court must still identify the relevant parcel to place on the
scale.
Three aspects of the relevant parcel determination reveal its
fundamental incoherence. The first aspect is the role played by previously
sold or noncontiguous parcels or interests, the divestment of which makes a
landowner more vulnerable to regulation. If we accept that risk is inherent in
any business endeavor, and that the Takings Clause is not designed to insure
against all losses due to fluctuations in the regulatory market, then some
landowners simply have to accept certain regulatory losses as a cost of
doing business. In that vein, takings jurisprudence needs a principled way to
distinguish between the landowner who took an unreasonable risk in buying
property interests that are barely adequate for her proposed plans and then
finds those plans frustrated when the interests of neighboring surface
owners, public wetlands, and the like prevent her from development, from
the landowner who acted reasonably and faces a total or near-total wipeout
from unexpected regulatory action. While some commentators suggest this
is fundamentally a question of reasonable investment-backed expectations, I
believe the issue is best analyzed under the relevant parcel determination,
because, as discussed below, ascertainable past actions are better suited for
legal analysis than future expectations.
The second aspect is the inappropriateness of using economic value in
analyzing the relevant parcel. To the extent courts use economic value or
economic viability in severing certain rights, like the right to exclude, or the
rights to descent and devise, and compensating owners for interference with
those rights, but not compensating for rights with little economic value, they
have moved a long way beyond any principled notion of the Takings Clause.
Specifically, our notion of property has moved beyond a bundle of rights to a
single right, the right to exploit a resource for a maximum amount of
money.22 6 And while many people may agree that this is the principal goal of
a property regime-that it protects economic value-our legal system has
clearly rejected such an absolutist position. 227 Regulation of the stock
market, business and labor practices, taxation, and a host of other restraints
affect economic value of goods and services and we do not allege, until
recently, a taking from these government actions. 28 Economic value is
certainly important in any robust property-based regime, but it simply
226 Professor Radin, especially, rejects the idea that property is mainly about money in her
path-breaking articles on "market inalienability." See Radin, supra note 82, at 1851, 1914.
227 Euclid establishes that the highest and best use of land is not constitutionally protected.
272 U.S. 365, 388-89 (1926).
228 See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522-23 (1998) (plurality opinion by O'Connor, J.)
(adjustment of economic burdens and benefits may be a compensable taking); Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Expropniatory Intent: Dering the Proper Boundaries of Substantive Due
Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 713, 714-20 (2002) (providing a lucid critique of
the shift away from traditional notions of property rights toward economic values that threaten
to swallow the Takings Clause).
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cannot serve as the quintessential factor in a takings calculation. And to the
extent severance and denominator calculations ultimately rely on economic
value, I argue the system is on a rapid slide down the slippery slope toward
destruction of the property regime itself.22
The third aspect is the fundamental tension between the dynamic use of
property over time and the snapshot evaluation that occurs in the takings
calculation when determining the regulatory moment. Why is the regulation
singled out as the cause of regulatory harm and not the sale of buffer lands
by the landowner, the overconstruction in the vicinity by others that
necessitates regulation, or the destruction of wildlife habitats and
watersheds? Carol Rose, quite sensibly, notes that regulation becomes a
necessary part of any property regime because it recognizes that, over time,
formerly ample resources become scarce and regulation is necessary to limit
the aggregate of social harms or complete destruction of public rights in
such unowned resources as air, water, or wildlife.2' Rose suggests that
because some people may be surprised by new regulations and their
expectations may be severely cut back, some grandfathering, exceptions,
and compensation may be appropriate to minimize demoralization costs.2 31 I
do not disagree. But I do want to emphasize that not everyone can be
grandfathered, given exceptions, or compensated. At some point, we all bear
the risk of regulatory change causing harm to our interests, expectations,
wishes, and pocketbooks. My theory of dynamic property, which looks at
landowner actions over time, provides a way to account for all three of these
problems within the relevant parcel calculation while retaining the most
important values of a property regime: the maximization of the sum total
opportunities of everyone to exercise and enjoy property rights which
necessarily results in the restriction of the rights of those who would choose
to exploit theirs to the utmost.
V. THE PROBLEM OF THE REGULATION'S TIMING
While it is easy to confuse the issue of temporary takings with a taking
of a temporal property right, it is also easy to confuse temporal severance
with issues over the timing of the regulation. In most instances, courts have
had little difficulty identifying the static moment to take the taldngs
snapshot-it is either the day the regulation becomes effective or the day the
permits are denied.232 On that day, market value of land is assumed to
229 To the extent protection of my property requires limiting your ability to harm me, any
government action becomes, in Coase's world, a relativistic exercise in "might makes right." See
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 17-18 (1960) (arguing that in the
absence of transaction costs, it does not matter which of two conflicting land uses is granted
the legal right because the parties will negotiate around any inefficient entitlements).
230 Property and Expropnations, supra note 18, at 6, 18.
231 Id at 19-22.
232 See Laura Schleich, Takings: The FIfth Amendment, Government Regulation, and the
Problem of the Relevant Parcel, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVrL. L. 381, 408 (1993) (arguing in favor of a
rule that "takes a snapshot of the property on the day the government imposes a regulation on
the property. The measure assesses the physical dimensions of the property on that day,
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plummet, property rights are believed to have been confiscated, and the
general regulatory scheme is suddenly visited upon the unoffending property
like the falling of the Sword of Damocles. A landowner who purchases after
the sword has fallen is assumed to have no claim to compensation because
she took the land with notice of the restraints. A landowner who purchased
before the regulation became effective is presumed to bear the full brunt of
the regulatory harm. In the vast majority of instances, the relevant parcel
and its uses is determined at this magic moment. But just as the relevant
parcel calculation can be affected by numerous preregulatory actions, it is
also dependent on when the regulation is presumed to have come into being.
Though I am not suggesting that the timing of the regulation is necessarily
up for grabs, I am suggesting that the relevant regulatory moment should not
be fixed when it is being used to determine the relevant parcel. In particular,
I suggest preregulation actions by landowners should be used to define a
regulatory window, not be excluded from the calculation of regulatory harm.
Ironically, while the Court has found the timeline to be somewhat
flexible in looking at postregulation changes in ownership, it has been
unwilling so far to look at preregulation changes in ownership.233 The
rejection of a strict timing rule for postregulation changes occurred in the
2001 case of Palazzolo, in which the question squarely presented was
whether acquisition of land postregulation could justify denial of
compensation on the assumption that the landowner acquired the land with
knowledge of the existence of the regulation.23 Justice O'Connor,
concurring, insisted that postregulation acquisition of the land did not
preclude a claim for inverse condemnation. The point raised in Palazzolo is
that when a regulation goes too far, compensation is due the owner at the
time the regulation goes into effect, though a subsequent owner may be
entitled to bring suit if the earlier owner was unable or unwilling to bring
suit, or ripen a suit, before a transfer to a subsequent owner occurred.233
In addressing the postregulation acquisition assumption, the Court did
not examine the corollary assumption that all preregulation acquisitions of
land are equally entitled to compensation if the regulatory impact is the
same. This is a question about whether all preregulation purchasers of land
are equally innocent in the creation of the regulatory harm, and therefore
equally entitled to compensation for a subsequent enactment, or whether
some owners should be denied compensation because, despite preregulation
without reference to segments no longer used or owned.").
233 See generally Stephen Abraham, Windfalls or Windmills: The Right of a Property Owner
to Challenge Use Regulations (A Call to Critically Reexamine the Meaning of Lucas), 13 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 161 (1997).
234 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606, 608-09 (2001).
235 The rejection in Palazzolo of a bright-line notice rule that would prohibit all takings
claims by landowners who acquire land after the regulation is also a rejection of the obverse
rule implied in Nollan, that postregulation acquisition is irrelevant. Thus, the Court has taken
the position that the timing of the regulation is not always relevant and not always irrelevant,
but rather that a landowner's expectations must be specifically analyzed on a case-by-case
basis. Under neither bright-line rule, however, has the Court addressed the question of a similar
flexible rule for preregulation acquisition. See generally Echeverria, supra note 10.
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acquisition, in relation to their actions and landholdings the law simply does
not go too far. We can look at this process as, in effect, moving the
regulatory moment either forward or backward, depending on the equities
and circumstances of the case.
While the issue was not directly before it in Palazzolo, the Court has
had numerous opportunities to address whether all landowners who are
equally affected by a regulation are equally entitled to compensation if they
owned the land prior to enactment of the regulation.236 To deny equal
treatment, though, assumes a somewhat more complex notion of "similarly
situated" than the Court currently uses, and that is the key to the other
intractable problem I identify. Can the Court coherently distinguish between
two landowners, each of whom acquired her land before a regulation went
into effect, each of whom owns virtually identical parcels of land which have
now become completely undevelopable as a result of a new regulation, and
each of whom claims significant loss of economic value of the only land
each owns? Though the Court would have to move to a more dynamic
understanding of land ownership and the effects of land regulation in order
to reach such a result, I argue the landowner who owned the contiguous
parcels and sold them before the regulation simply should not have the same
claim as a person who bought just the regulated lot and had not participated
in the surrounding development.
The example I am obviously alluding to is the Beachfront Management
Act in Lucas, in which a newly redrawn coastal zone management act
rendered David Lucas's two beachfront lots completely undevelopable. 37
But imagine that there were two owners of these lots rather than one, each
one affected by the new regulation, each unable to build or develop the land
in any way, neither owning any other land in the near vicinity, so that the
horizontal and functional parcel-as-a-whole problems would not distinguish
between the two. Could the Court justify treating these two parties
differently? I argue, "Yes. . .under certain circumstances."
Consider the following amendments to the Lucas scenario above: In
case 1, landowner A recently purchased a single lot on which he intended to
build his retirement home on the beach on the Isle of Palms outside
Charleston, South Carolina. Moments after closing on the lot, for which he
paid $300,000, the South Carolina legislature modified the Beachfront
Management Act so that he is absolutely precluded from building any
structure on his new land. The economic impact of the regulation is
$300,000, plus perhaps any appreciation in value from the anticipated return
on the development. Surely such a landowner would have a valid takings
claim.2 38
236 The Court could have addressed this issue in Lucas, Palazzolo, Tahoe-Sierra, and Penn
Central had it wanted to confront squarely the different situations of developers and small
landowners.
237 Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007 (1992).
238 This is the scenario ostensibly presented in Lucas, and the rule in Lucas would demand
that the landowners be compensated.
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Consider next landowner B, a real estate developer, who purchased
enough acreage to develop 100 home sites on the Isle of Palms. After selling
99 lots for a hefty profit (say $300,000 per lot), he decided to retain the last
lot for his own homesite. He expended $300,000 in architect and engineering
fees that would enable him to custom-build a home on this unique piece of
land. Just before applying for the building permit, however, the legislature
amended the Beachfront Management Act to preclude building on his last
remaining lot, even though he had already invested $300,000 in this, his only
remaining parcel of land in South Carolina.
Should both landowner A and landowner B be treated similarly? Both
lost development rights in the only land they owned in South Carolina and
both arguably invested $300,000 in the right to build a home on their
particular lots. Under the Court's current takings doctrine, which looks only
at economic impact, reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the
character of the governmental action, or more strictly at the categorical
compensation obligation because of the loss of 100% of economic value,
both landowners would be treated equally, with perhaps even landowner B
faring better because his $300,000 investment is in architect and engineering
fees and was not in the purchase price of the land.239 This is because both
are viewed at the moment the regulation precluded development of the lots.
But is this the right result when we consider the actions of landowner B
whose voluntary actions influenced the regulatory and economic
marketplace? 240
While no one has suggested that the timing of the regulation is a
necessary and sufficient cause for a takings claim, courts and commentators
have hesitated to stray very far from the regulatory moment in determining a
landowner's holdings and analyzing how they are affected by a regulation.
For how, one might ask, could a regulation affect property before it is
enacted?2 41 That, however, is the wrong way of thinking about the issue.
Instead, courts should ask how a landowner's actions affect the impact of a
regulation. And if certain preregulatory actions by the landowner intensify
the negative effects of regulation, the takings analysis should look to the
property over time, not just the impact at the regulatory moment. The timing
analysis thus becomes an examination of multiple actions and land values
within a relevant window, not a static snapshot.
But admitting that a glance backward to preregulation actions may be
warranted does not solve the entire dilemma, for it does not tell us how far
back to look or when to stop retroactive analyses of the relevant parcel. At
some point a landowner should feel free in the knowledge that his or her
239 Perhaps he can claim a vested right to the prior regulatory scheme by virtue of significant
investments in parcel-specific planning, even though he had not yet obtained a permit. See
supra note 6 (discussing vested rights).
240 Landowner B may also have foreseen the impending regulatory change and positioned
himself to benefit from a takings rule premised on 100% economic loss. By creating a lot for
which the only viable use is building a home, landowner B arguably participated in the creation
of the regulatory harm.
241 See Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 1055 (1997) (presenting an excellent study of the Court's retroactivity rules).
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actions will not have a negative impact on future takings claims. If the
examples and explanations I have offered above raise some questions about
the Court's current relevant parcel rules, then we need not only a theory on
when it is acceptable to look behind the regulatory moment, but we also
need to know when to look forward again. The window needs a casement on
both sides. Fortunately, traditional common law property rules can give us
some guidance in these areas, as they have already done so in the areas of
nuisance, lateral support, quiet enjoyment, and other rights.
V. A NEW THEORY OF DYNAMIC PROPERTY: LOOKING BACKWARD
WrrHOuT FALLING OFF THE EDGE
The relevant parcel and the timing problems may not seem integrally
related, but a more dynamic understanding of land ownership and
development based in nuisance, lateral support, and unity of title can
provide analogies for resolving many of the tensions and contradictions
identified in the discussions above. The Court needs a method for evaluating
the effect of regulations in terms of the character of the government's action
as well as the character of the landowner's actions, pre- and postregulation.
Not only does it need a way to determine what the relevant physical parcel is
for purposes of the regulatory takings calculation, but it also needs to know
the relevant time period during which the landowner's actions will be
examined for determining the relevant parcel over time. Just as the relevant
parcel needs boundaries so we do not look to land holdings on the other side
of the continent, there need to be outer limits on how far before the
regulatory moment we can look to determine the regulatory window, and
how far ahead of the regulatory moment before we close the window to
future takings claims. As the Court's jurisprudence stands today, very few
previous actions by a landowner dealing with the acquisition and sale of
contiguous or related parcels, or severance of any kind, count for
determining economic impact, investment-backed expectations, or the
relevant parcel.242 I encourage the Court to open that window.
From the foregoing discussion on the different forms of severance, it is
apparent that other common law property doctrines may provide a model
for treating land development over time in terms of a duty arising out of
severance and prior voluntary actions. Common law doctrines of lateral
support and unity of title offer good starting points. Consider, for example, a
little-known case out of Massachusetts, in which a landowner who had built
a home on Beacon Hill attempted to stop the construction of a new house
just downhill that would jeopardize the lateral support of his house." The
general rule in such cases is that the downhill owner must provide absolute
lateral support for land in its natural state and support for land on which
242 There is a circularity problem inherent in ad hoc balancing insofar as economic impact or
reasonable investment-backed expectations are used to determine either the relevant parcel or
the existence of a taking.
243 Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass. 220, 224 (1815).
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buildings have been erected through at least a level of nonnegligence. 44
Thus, removal of the lateral support cannot be undertaken negligently or the
excavator will be liable for damage to his neighbor's buildings. But in
Thurston v. Hancock (Thurston), the Massachusetts Supreme Court denied
recovery for damage to the preexisting home, not on a theory of
nonnegligence by the downhill owner, but based on prior actions of the
uphill neighbor who built his house too close to the lot line. As Chief Justice
Parker stated:
[T]his subjection of the use of a man's own property to the convenience of his
neighbour is founded upon a supposed preexisting right in his neighbour to
have and enjoy the privilege which by such act is impaired.... A man in digging
upon his own land is to have regard to the position of his neighbour's land, and
the probable consequences to his neighbour, if he digs too near his line; and if
he disturbs the natural state of the soil, he shall answer in damages; but he is
answerable only for the natural and necessary consequences of his act, and not
for the value of a house put upon or near the line by his neighbour. For, in so
placing the house, the neighbour was in fault, and ought to have taken better
care of his interest.... The plaintiff built his house within two feet of the
western line of the lot, knowing that the town or those who should hold under
it, had a right to build equally near to the line, or to dig down into the soil for
any other lawful purpose. He knew also the shape and nature of the ground,
and that it was impossible to dig there without causing excavations. He built at
his peril; for it was not possible for him, merely by building upon his own
ground, to deprive the other party of such use of his as he should deem most
advantageous.
245
In departing from the general rule that the prior user has an entitlement
that would prevent the downhill builder from endangering his building, the
court adopted a rule that recognizes the reciprocal nature of each
landowner's development needs and the symmetrical impact each person's
exercise of property rights had on the other. By not giving an entitlement to
the first user, the court is holding the first user accountable for actions that
have consequences later in time.
There are many versions of this ethic of reciprocity, some positive and
some negative. The golden rule says do unto others as you would have
others do unto you,2 46 while a negative version admonishes one to not do to
others that which you do not want done to yourself.2 47 The rule we can
extract from Thurston would be a version of the golden rule: One can be
restrained from acting in ways that, if everyone did likewise, would result in
conflicting uses and their resultant harm.24 I call this the reciprocity rule.
244 See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 147 at 419-21.
245 Thurston, 12 Mass. at 224, 229.
246 The New Testament adopts such a rule. Matthew 7:12.
247 This is a Buddhist teaching as well as a Talmudic teaching. See the Udana-Varga 5:18 and
the Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 31a. For a more general discussion of the golden rule, see
H.T.D. ROST, THE GOLDEN RULE: A UNIVERSAL ETHic (1986).
248 This is a very simplified version of Kant's categorical imperative. See Immanuel Kant,
Metaphysical Foundation of Morals, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 170 (Carl Friedrich ed. 1949)
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Under this rule, a landowner may not impose harm on neighbors by actions
on her own land that threaten or limit the equivalent or dependent rights of
others. This is simply a rule forcing neighbors to internalize external costs
that would otherwise fall on adjacent parcels of land, whether it is building
too close to a lot line, expelling surface water, or fencing land in a wildlife
corridor that diverts animals onto the land of others. This reciprocity rule is
little more than a fairly stringent application of the doctrine of sic utere tuo
ut alienum non laedas,249 but it includes the idea that landowners must self-
insure to a reasonable extent. A landowner who buys only enough land to
build a house, with no extra room left over for yards or driveways, not only
imposes on neighbors the burden of open space and access, but stakes a
claim to behavior that the neighbors cannot emulate. If my building injures
the house of my neighbor because he has not left sufficient yard, then I
cannot use my property in the same way he has.250 He imposes external
costs on my property rights, and he has voluntarily chosen to risk his
investment on a legal rule that the first-in-time user will prevail.
While we could make all sorts of social utility arguments about risk
assessment, the economics of insuring against changes in legal rights, and
nuisance rules, the issue remains one of the exercise of property rights, not
the possession or ownership of property rights. Regulations, among other
things, substitute global solutions to conflicting uses for private common
law rules like nuisance or negligence. A regulatory change that suddenly
zones for larger yards and setbacks generally serves the same purpose as
private ordering through nuisance. So shouldn't our regulatory takings
jurisprudence take some lessons from the logic of private nuisance rules?
The point here is that the uphill landowner in Thurston, like the developer
who sold off all land but the wetlands, seeks to maximize economic return
and exploit his property rights to the utmost, in a world in which such
behavior injures others.25 Since we cannot all build to the very edge of our
lot lines, the ultimate question for the Takings Clause is whether everyone
should be expected to self-insure to a modest amount, or whether the
("Therefore there is only one categorical imperative, namely this: Act only on a maxim by which
you can will that it, at the same time, should become a general law.").
249 "So use your own Property as not to injure your neighbor's." LATIN FOR LAWYERS, 243
(1992). This embodies the idea that a plaintiff property owner has a nuisance claim against a
neighbor whose use of his own property interferes with the use and enjoyment of the plaintiffs
property. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 147, at 413-17. But just as the courts are able to
determine reasonableness in other contexts, they should be able to determine whether
construction of a single residence, a multi-residence development, or a nuclear power plant
imposes unreasonable externalities on neighbors such that, if they too acted like the landowner,
property uses would collide. Inherent in sic utere is an element of reasonableness that must be
evaluated by a court, and would need to exist in any rule designed to address competing land
uses.
250 One can argue that this means no one can pollute or build because eventually one's
neighbors cannot do the same, but there should be a happy medium where courts attempt to
maximize the total exercise of property rights by minimizing conflicting uses and preventing
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government will provide compensation either to the uphill landowner who is
prohibited from maximizing the exercise of her property rights by building
to the lot line or the downhill neighbor who cannot exercise any rights at all
because she is precluded from building by the uphill neighbor's actions.
Unlike the traditional application of the sic utere rule that would
prohibit a use of property by one owner that causes substantial harm to
another,2 5 the reciprocity rule focuses on actions by the landowner crying
foul that rendered her property susceptible to harm from neighboring
landowners or protective regulations. The reciprocity rule simply tells
landowners not to build on the edge of their lots. Rather, they must dedicate
a certain amount of space as a protective buffer if they wish to insure the
value and stability of their investments. A landowner who sells all her land
except one particularly sensitive piece of wetlands is at least partially
responsible for suddenly being unable to utilize any of her retained land
after the Clean Water Act amendments. This rule puts the risk on those best
able to prevent the harm, the landowners, by holding them accountable for
taking reasonable steps to protect their investments rather than using the
taxpayer, through condemnation awards, to fund an insurance program for
risky decision making.253
A second rule comes out of unity of title cases, especially those cases
that give rise to implied legal duties, such as easements by necessity and
prior use. In certain circumstances, the law will impose a legal duty to grant
an easement when a grantor severs her land and, in so doing, creates a
landlocked parcel.254 Because enjoyment of the new parcel depends on
access, and severing into two parcels created the need for the access in the
first place, courts will imply an easement even if contrary to the intent of the
parties.255 This is not the only instance where obligations arise out of
severing property. A grantor who leases land will be obligated to protect
warranties of habitability and suitability in severed leaseholds. 256 A tenant
who subleases may not jeopardize the subtenant's possession by breaching
the head lease.2 57 A grantor of a future interest may not waste the property
because the remaindermen have property interests in receiving the land in
252 See, e.g., Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182, 191 (Wisc. 1982) (holding private nuisance law
applicable to rights of use of sunlight for heating purposes).
253 1 recognize that the landowner may not always be the best able to insure, but to the
extent she can, that seems a relevant issue for denominator purposes. If she is not in the best
position to insure, her reasonable investment-backed expectations should permit compensation
under ad hoc balancing.
254 See Charles C. Marvel, Annotation, "at Constitutes Unity of TYtle or Ownership
Sufficient for Creation of an Easement by Implication or Way of Necessity, 94 A.L.R.3d 502
(1979) (collecting cases).
255 See, e.g., Finn v. Williams, 33 N.E.2d 226, 228 (111. 1941) (holding such appurtenant
easements survive dormant through a subsequent conveyance of the dominant estate).
256 See STOEBUCK & WHrTMAN, supra note 147, at 284-86; Blackett v. Olanoff, 358 N.E.2d 817,
820 (Mass. 1976) (finding tenant's implied covenant of habitability breached by landlord when
he could have controlled the noise from his other tenant, a bar).
257 See STOEBUCK & WHrrMAN, supma note 147, at 384; Unionport Shoes, Inc. v. Parkchester S.
Condominium, Inc., 613 N.Y.S.2d 605, 607 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (voluntary surrender of lease by
tenant would not operate to terminate the sublease).
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good shape.25 All of these are examples of duties the law imposes on
grantors, whose acts of severance and conveyance give rise to duties not to
undermine the enjoyment and quality of the grantee's rights.
These common law rules are just a few examples in which the law
imposes duties and obligations on one parcel of land for the benefit of
another when the enjoyment of the latter depends on restrictions of the
former, and when there had been at one time unity of title, the severance of
which created the dependency relationship in the first place.259 The law does
not interfere when a landowner chooses to impose a burden on one part of
her land for the benefit of another part.260 She may place a driveway over the
front half of her land for the benefit of the back section. She may choose to
excavate in such a way as to cause collapse of one portion of her land. But if
she chooses to subdivide her land, and the integrity of one parcel is
dependent on the lateral support or an access easement of the other, the law
will impose such a servitude.26 1 The law generally will not create such
servitudes for two random parcels of land, parcels that are unrelated to each
other. But where there was unity of title and the severance of the parcels
created the vulnerability of one separately owned parcel of land on another,
the law will impose a duty on the servient estate to not undermine the
enjoyment of the dominant estate, even at times where the parties have
contracted otherwise.26 2 These rules arise in the context of servitudes and
leaseholds where a prior or ongoing relationship creates duties not to
unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment of the grantee or lessee's
property." It is a small stretch, therefore, to impose similar obligations in
fee simple transfers of land by a developer who can best insure against
physical or legal harms from the developer's activities. I call this second rule
the severance rule.
Combining the reciprocity and severance rules would prevent a
developer who subdivides land into residential parcels and does not leave
adequate room on each side to meet setback and building code obligations
from transferring that cost to innocent grantees. Notably, both the
reciprocity rule and the severance rule are based in equity. Obligations arise
from severance not because of the legal property rights created, but because
the circumstances demand that equity adjust the rights of the parties to
reflect their dependent relationship. Notions of fairness require that a
258 STOEBUCK &WHITMAN, supra note 147, at 146-59.
259 Easements by necessity and implied warranties in leases all require a common grantor.
260 STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 147, at 445.
261 Id. at 447-49. See generaly Finn v. Williams, 33 N.E.2d 226 (111. 1941).
262 For instance, even if the parties agree to the purchase of a landlocked parcel, the law will
imply a mandatory easement by necessity so as not to create inaccessible and therefore
unusable lands.
263 STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 147, at 281, 910. They include the covenant of quiet
enjoyment in which the lessor guarantees to defend the lessee's possession from others
claiming a superior right. Id. at 281. They also include the warranties of habitability and
suitability by which a lessor is obligated to provide suitable, fit premises and repair them as the
need arises. Id. at 293. The doctrine of caveat emptorno longer applies in the residential lease
situation or in sales of new homes so that a grantee is no longer forced to assume the risk of
uninhabitable premises. Id. at 292.
[Vol. 34:175
HeinOnline  -- 34 Envtl. L. 228 2004
A NEW TIME FOR DENOMINA TORS
landowner not be allowed to act in ways that impose unreasonable
externalities on others. Implied easements by necessity, implied reciprocal
negative easements, and implied covenants of quiet enjoyment and
warranties of habitability and suitability all reflect discomfort with the
traditional legal rule of caveat emptor.264 But while property law has been
quick to embrace these equitable rules in disputes between private parties,
they have generally not been recognized in the context of takings law.215 One
problem with takings jurisprudence is that it has viewed the operation of
regulations in a vacuum without investigating adequately whether or not
government restrictions simply prevent the breach of these common law
duties or impose unexpected newly created duties. In the end, however, a
dynamic theory of property that recognizes the many relationships and
duties protected by the common law would more accurately account for
preregulation actions by landowners that, in all fairness, should be
considered in determining the relevant parcel.
Although the analysis may be complex, I suggest that a combined
severance rule and reciprocity rule be applied to any denominator
calculation. I call this combined rule the rule of "dynamic denominators." It
goes something like this: Where a landowner through her voluntary actions,
either in severing property rights or in her use and development of her own
land, creates a situation in which harm266 to the property rights of others or
the public may occur, a regulation that subsequently creates an intensified
economic impact or limits use and development rights is not a taking of a
property right to which she was entitled in the first place.2 67 We can break
down the dynamic denominator rule as follows: 1) At some time in the past,
this landowner owned enough property so that, under Penn Central
balancing, the regulation's impact would not be so severe as to require
compensation; 2a) the landowner voluntarily severed her property in such a
way as to make the regulation's impact on the retained property more
severe; or 2b) acted in ways which, if others acted that way, would lead to
incompatible land uses; and 3) the interests of those owners to whom she
sold her other land or the public would be injured by her being allowed to
exploit her retained property to the fullest extent. If these elements are met
for a given set of actions by the landowner, we reopen the regulatory
window to take account of the prior actions and prior landholdings in
making the relevant parcel calculation.
264 The caveat emptor rule traditionally applied to leaseholds in which the tenant would be
out of luck if the house burned down after she took possession, or the building deteriorated due
to normal wear and tear. Landlords were not expected to do even basic maintenance. See
STOEBUCK & WHrTMAN, supra note 147, at 290 (describing relatively new implied warranty of
habitability).
265 It seems terribly important to recognize the inequity of forcing the taxpayer to bear a
burden of compensating landowners whose actions violate the severance or reciprocity rule.
266 By harm I mean unreasonable limitations on the exercise of one's property rights or an
unreasonable increase in the economic impact of future regulations.
267 This goes beyond the background principles of Lucas because it expands the duties
outside the context of prior relationships to include harm to the public and harms beyond the
narrow easement, lateral support, and leasehold categories in which these doctrines are
currently applied.
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Breaking down the rule, note that we have expanded the regulatory
window for determining the relevant parcel into the past, into a time prior to
the enactment of the regulation. We are analyzing whether, had the
regulation gone into effect prior to the voluntary severance, compensation
would still be due under a Penn Central analysis. If there would be no
compensation if measured at the earlier time, so that the relevant parcel was
the one hundred acres, not the retained one acre, or the entire fee simple
absolute, and not the retained mineral and support estates, then
compensation would not be due today even if the new regulation causes
100% economic loss of the newly vulnerable, smaller property.
But moving the window back requires some analysis of the property
owner's role in causing the situation for which compensation may be due.
Where a property owner purchases a single lot in a subdivision previously
owned by a common owner, with the expectation and assurances of being
able to put a house on the land, the new landowner is not responsible for
creating the vulnerability for which the regulation is now particularly
harmful and would, therefore, be entitled to compensation. That person is
like the grantee who receives a landlocked parcel and expects to be able to
enjoy access to her new land. She is not responsible for creating the need for
the easement by necessity. The responsible person is the one who severed
the land in the first place.
This does not mean that a landowner would be precluded from bringing
an inverse condemnation claim just because she was responsible for certain
actions that made the effect of the new regulation more harmful. Rather, for
determining one element in the balancing test, the relevant parcel, we should
look to the voluntary actions of the landowner that resulted in any reduction
of her property and analyze whether those actions contributed to the greater
susceptibility of the retained land to harm caused by the regulation. If the
landowner was responsible for making herself vulnerable to competing
claims by neighbors, the public, or the government, as in Thurston, the
relevant parcel should be calculated at a time before those actions occurred.
Additionally, we should look to the effect of the landowner's actions on
neighbors, the public, and other interest holders with proprietary values
protected by our laws. Thus, if Mr. Lucas's construction of a beachfront
home, in contravention of the new regulation, would cause harm to the
neighboring lots which he created, then the relevant parcel should include
those now-threatened lots he once owned.28 Similarly, if Pennsylvania Coal
is responsible for putting surface estates into the hands of others, and a
regulation prevents them from exploiting their retained land in ways that
will harm those surface estates, the relevant parcel should be the fee simple
absolute it once owned. The relevant parcel should be calculated at a time
before those estates were severed because otherwise the landowner is
receiving a windfall-first when he sells the land and second when he harms
it without liability.
268 The purpose of beachfront management acts is to protect current structures and beaches
facing increased erosion and destruction of buildings caused by development too close to the
water's edge.
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Furthermore, it is not just harm to one's own successors in interest that
can be prevented by government regulations without raising duties to
compensate, but also harm to public property rights. For instance, an entire
town may rely on five hundred acres of wetlands for its water supply. Under
current takings rules, a landowner who owns 100 acres of land-90 acres of
non-wetlands and 10 acres of the wetlands necessary for the town-can be
prevented from harming the wetlands under the police power to regulate for
the benefit of the general public without being entitled to compensation.269 If
that same landowner develops and sells the 90 upland acres, thus further
increasing the burden on the local water supply, and retains the 10 wetlands
acres before any new regulation prohibiting destruction of the town's
wetlands is implemented, it is even more reasonable to deny compensation
because the landowner's prior actions contributed to an increased pressure
on the town's and the landowner's remaining wetlands. In a sense, the
landowner has already received a benefit built into the sale of the 90 lots
from the undeveloped 10 acres of wetlands, and further development would
in fact harm not only the rest of the town but also the 90 new owners. Thus,
the 100 acres would be the relevant parcel, both before development and
sale and afterwards, because of the interdependence of the 10 wetland acres
with the severed 90 acres.
What is important about the rule of dynamic denominators is that it
does not preclude a compensation action by landowners who, at one time,
owned more contiguous land or acted so as to make themselves vulnerable
to regulation. Rather, it holds that the relevant parcel determination should
take account of these actions, that doing so is fair, and that doing so will
help us better address whether a regulation goes too far and whether the
taxpayer or the landowner should bear the cost of the harm from a
regulation. One factor, the denominator, is broadened, but it should not
become conclusive. To better understand the dynamic denominator rule, we
can apply it to certain controversial takings situations.
VI. A RULE OF DYNAMIC DENOMINATORS
Although an exhaustive analysis of how such a dynamic denominator
rule would play out in every taking situation is not possible, a few examples
will help clarify the goals that would be furthered by such a rule.
First, landowners who sever their land and convey a portion to others
would have a duty not to harm the interests they create. When they place an
innocent party into possession of property rights, that party obtains
independent rights appurtenant to the property that cannot be destroyed by
the grantor. In particular, the grantee acquires some of the rights originally
possessed by the grantor, as well as a right to prevent the grantor from
interfering with or destroying the rights of the grantee. For example, when a
landowner rents her apartments to tenants, she will owe a duty not to
269 See Euclid, 272 U.S. 365, 392-97 (1926) (discussing how broad restraints from a land-use
ordinance restricted a landowner's ability to sell his land for certain uses was a valid exercise of
police power authority to benefit public welfare).
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interfere with the rights of the tenants to receive cable television service. A
developer will likewise owe a duty to grantees not to exacerbate beach
erosion or destroy the development's water supply. A takings challenge to
regulations enforcing these duties should consider the land owned prior to
severance as the relevant parcel because the retained and severed lands are
intertwined with dependent duties and relationships.
The severance rule would have us view the case of Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp. (Loretto)270 not as a dispute over the
effect of a cable access regulation on the landowner (i.e., a dispute between
the landowner and the government), but as a question of whether the actions
of the landowner putting someone else into possession of a property right
creates a legal duty not to interfere with those rights. Rather than assume
the landowner continues to own the full panoply of property rights,
including the right to exclude cable providers, and take a snapshot of the
effect of the regulation in imposing a physical invasion on an unwilling
landowner, the court should instead look at the landowner's activities in
renting out apartments and becoming responsible for protecting the
enjoyment of the tenant's possessory rights. While there is no question a
landowner cannot be forced to accept the physical invasion of a cable
company on her own land over which she has exclusive possession, the act
of severing her property rights and selling leasehold interests to others
makes her, in a sense, a guarantor not to destroy or frustrate the reasonable
enjoyment of the interests of those whose possession she made possible in
the first place.
The crucial question in Loretto then becomes whether or not cable
television access is reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the severed
leasehold, interference with which would constitute a breach of her duty. If
it is, the relevant parcel analysis should look at her voluntary act of
severance and determine if she retained the right to exclusivity or
transferred it and therefore should be prohibited from acting in ways that
would harm the right she created in her tenants. A dynamic analysis of
Loretto includes in the relevant parcel calculation the landowner's voluntary
act in severing her estate by granting leaseholds, and her consequent
obligation not to harm the property rights she created.271 Under such a rule,
Ms. Loretto would be treated differently than an owner who has not severed
out a leasehold and maintains an expectation of exclusivity.27z
The relevant parcel analysis in Loretto would have us look back at the
time before severance into leaseholds and reversionary rights to possession
and note that she received payment for the value of the right to possession, a
270 458 U.S. 419 (1981).
271 She owns not just the common areas, but the entire apartment building, and has a duty
not to interfere with the enjoyment of her tenants. The exercise of her property rights should
not harm the exercise of property rights of those she put into possession.
272 Ironically, dynamic denominators would find Loretto's relevant parcel to either not
contain the right to exclude (she transferred it to her tenants for value), or to consist of the
entire fee and present possessory rights of the tenants and, even though the trespass occurs in
the common areas, those areas are interrelated to the areas that have been transferred to the
tenants.
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right that traditionally includes the right to exclude the lessor and the rest of
the world.27 3 She has already been paid, presumably fair market value, for
the right to exclude from the leased premises.27 4 For this calculation, we
would find that, upon viewing the land transactions over time, the
landowner may have already sold the right to exclude cable service and
therefore did not lose any property right she possessed when the regulation
was enacted. This is different from the dissent's reasoning in Loretto, which
argued that by entering into the rental market the landowner became liable
to provide certain services to tenants, including mailboxes, fire prevention
equipment, and the like.275 The dissent discussed the government's right to
protect tenants in basic access to services.276 My analysis would instead
focus on voluntary actions of the landowner which placed property rights in
the hands of innocent third parties and whether those property rights
reasonably included the right to exclude cable television service. By
analyzing her preregulatory actions in severing the property into leaseholds,
we find that she has already been compensated for giving up an expectation
of exclusive possession.
Similarly, the surface rights created by the coal companies in Mahon
would be analyzed along the same axis. Because the coal companies were
directly responsible for severing their fees simple into mineral, support, and
surface estates, they should owe a duty not to harm the enjoyment of those
they put into possession of the surface lands. How this severing would work
in determining the relevant parcel is even easier with Mahon than with
Loretto. In the former, we would consider the relevant parcel to be the fee
simple absolute before severance of the surface lands. The effect of the
regulation on the fee simple would be to effectively foreclose severance,
forcing the coal companies to absorb the cost of destruction of the surface
estate. Since those companies that already sold the surface rights
presumably received fair market value for the surface estate, they have
already received compensation. Hence, in not allowing the coal companies
to destroy the surface estate for which they already received payment, the
regulation merely prevents them from receiving double payment, first when
they sell the surface, and then when they destroy it without liability to the
surface owner.
Both Loretto and Mahon were cases in which a landowner had severed
the fee, functionally (into leaseholds and reversionary rights to possession)
and vertically (into mineral, support, and surface estates), retaining only a
273 STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 147, at 255-56.
274 The question then is whether cable television access is included in the right to possession
she sold to her tenants, or is a right she retained and for which she should receive additional
compensation. Although the Court may be implying the latter, the complete lack of discussion
of such reasoning implies that it instead considered Ms. Loretto no different from any other fee
simple absolute owner of land. Courts today would almost certainly agree that a right to cable
television access is part of the tenant's leasehold, likely finding that over time the landowner
has already been compensated in rent to give up the right to exclude cable television services.
275 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 452 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (explaining the other physical
items a landlord must provide a tenant).
276 Id.
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fraction of the fee, and the regulation at issue imposed a duty not to harm
the severed interests. 277 In that sense, the two cases are easy. A similar
process works when calculating the relevant parcel for land that is severed
horizontally. Consider again the case of David Lucas, who was a part owner
of the Wild Dune Development on the Isle of Palms, South Carolina. As part
owner, he participated in the development and sale of numerous residential
lots.27 Nearly a decade after commencing development, Lucas bought two of
the last four vacant lots in the development.2 ' When the South Carolina
legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act in 1987, it enlarged the
areas of designated critical beachfront land, thus precluding development on
Lucas's two lots.
As part owner of the entire development, at one time Lucas owned
significantly more than the two lots at issue in the case. But after the
partnership conveyed all the rest of the lots, Lucas bought out the
outstanding partnership's interests in the two lots which were later to be
restricted. It would be unfair to view the relevant parcel as the entire
development because there were other owners. But it would be fair to view
the relevant parcel as his proportional interest in the entire parcel before
development, or perhaps the exchange value of those severed lots. To the
extent the severance created lots that were too small and thus vulnerable to
erosion, Lucas had a part in creating two particularly vulnerable lots by not
leaving sufficient buffer land to accommodate erosion.8 0
Of course, what if instead of being active as the developer and partner
in Wild Dune Development, David Lucas had been simply an innocent buyer
of these two lots-a man with no other ownership or investment interests in
land in the area, and a reasonably astute investor who honestly believed that
the lots would not likely be subject to any further beachfront regulation? For
such an owner, the relevant parcel would be determined to be the two lots,
for there would be no earlier window that would yield a different
denominator. To the extent the regulation destroyed 100% of all economic
value, and Lucas had not participated in any way in the actions that made
277 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421-24; Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412-14 (1922).
278 See F. Patrick Hubbard, Palazzolo, Lucas, and Penn Central: The Need for Pragmatism,
Symbolism, and Ad Hoe Balancing, 80 NEB. L. REv. 465, 484-85 (2001) (questioning why the
Court did not consider the larger Wild Dunes Development to be the relevant parcel); Jennifer
Dick & Andrew Chandler, Shifting Sands: The Implementation of Lucas on the Evolution of
Takings Law and South Carolina's Application of the Lucas Rule, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
637, 696-97 (2003) (discussing ownership of the lots involved in Lucas both before and after the
Supreme Court decision).
279 See supra note 59.
280 Lucas's situation is similar to the landowner on Beacon Hill who built too close to the lot
line and was therefore unable to recover for damage when his neighbor undermined his lateral
support. Because Lucas severed the larger acreage into lots, he made the two affected lots too
small by not giving them enough upland space on which to build and still have enough tidal land
to respond to the tremendous changes caused by beach erosion. Secondly, Lucas is responsible
for placing the other severed lots into the possession of innocent third parties. To the extent his
building on his two lots might cause additional erosion to the previously severed lots, he also
owes a duty not to use his retained land to harm the property rights he created in his innocent
buyers. Both the reciprocity rule and the severance rule would suggest that we determine the
relevant parcel in this case as his proportional share in the entire development.
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the land vulnerable to the regulation, he would be entitled to compensation
by the state for the destruction of his property rights.
281
The examples above all concern some form of severance and
subsequent regulatory harm in which the landowner's act of severing the
property made either his own retained property or the property he sold to
innocent buyers vulnerable to invasion or destruction. The regulations all
attempted to shift the cost of that destruction back onto those who severed
the property in the first place or prevented shifting that burden onto
innocent buyers. As a matter of fairness, and in concert with traditional
property laws on unity of title and implied warranties, these cases are
relatively easy. We could perhaps even argue that Loretto, Mahon, and Lucas
were all wrongly decided simply because the regulations at issue prevented
the landowners from harming other innocent property owners and, under
the doctrine of sic utere, did not take a right they had in the first place.28 2
Thus, one bright-line rule of dynamic denominators is that where a
regulation imposes a restriction or causes loss in value to a parcel of
retained land for the principal benefit of land once owned by the same
landowner and now severed, the relevant parcel should be deemed the
entire parcel before severance. Ms. Loretto's building before the lease, the
Wild Dune Development before severance into residential lots, and the fee
simple absolute of the coal companies before sale of the surface estates
should be deemed the relevant parcel because the landowner was
responsible for the severance, reaped a benefit from the severance, and
owes a duty to the innocent grantees not to destroy the property rights the
landowner made possible. To the extent the regulation merely prevents the
landowner from harming the rights of her grantees, and she received
valuable consideration from those grantees for the property rights, she has
already received adequate compensation for the restrictions on her retained
land.
But in the absence of unity of title and severance, how would dynamic
denominators work for restrictions aimed at preventing harm to strangers in
title, like neighbors or the general public? To some extent the severance rule
may drop out and the reciprocity rule may take up the slack. If a landowner's
actions have caused the regulation to work particular hardships, such as in
the instance where a landowner has built too close to the lot line, left
inadequate setbacks, or has dredged a nonnavigable pond to make it
navigable, the landowner is directly responsible for any impact associated
with imposition of the regulatory regime.2 3 Consider the case of Kaiser
281 However, might he not also have a claim against the grantor of his two lots for making the
lots too small? If the developer should reasonably have known that those lots would suffer
destruction from tidal erosion, then the developer may be liable for selling a piece of land that
would be unsuitable for the purpose for which it was sold. Again, we are back to the warranty
of quiet enjoyment and the warranty of suitability that a landowner owes to innocent
purchasers of property the landowner has severed.
282 Both the nuisance exception and the background principles of Lucas might provide
justification for a different outcome in all three of these cases. But dynamic denominators go
even further.
283 See Kaiser Aetna 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (presenting the United States's argument that the
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Aetna in this regard. By dredging a channel in a nonnavigable pond to access
a private marina, the plaintiffs knowingly made their land susceptible to the
federal navigational servitude.2 4 If we view the landowner's actions in
making itself vulnerable to the navigational servitude as similar to the
landowner who built too close to his lot line, thus infringing on neighboring
or public property rights, then the rights allegedly taken by the regulation
were actually given up by the landowner through prior voluntary actions.
But beyond bright-line rules for harm caused to severed lots or
landowners' actions making themselves especially vulnerable to the harm
caused by regulation, the line becomes much fuzzier in the context of
landowner actions affecting economic value or landowner actions causing
harm to diffuse public goods. The dynamic denominator rule becomes much
more complex when the regulation does not prevent immediate harm, but
rather destroys the economic value of property in the name of aesthetics,
harmonious and orderly development, or of regulating for compatible uses
that have diffuse beneficial effects on neighboring land. There may be a
distinction between zoning a parcel into disutility for the aesthetic benefit of
a neighborhood,8 5 and preventing development of a parcel because it will
cause surface water runoff, block light and air, or increase erosion of
neighboring beachfront land. Although courts have rejected the notion that
the only obligations that are appurtenant to land are those that provide a
"physical advantage in the occupation of the land,"286 it is not so easy, under
traditional rules of property law, to require that land be used in such a way
as to confer benefits on neighboring land.
Of course, there are theoretical difficulties with the distinction between
harm-prevention and benefit-conferring in the regulatory takings context. 8 7
Any theory of dynamic denominators must provide some general way to
chart a course between the Scylla of the distinction between harm and
benefit problem and the Charybdis of the economic value as property right
problem. As suggested earlier, the court in Florida Rock IVwas not gazing at
its navel when it split over the issue of whether compensation was due
simply for destruction in value, or whether that value had to be tied to a
definable property right in order to invoke the duty to compensate.2 88
Drawing some principled line in the sand for determining when the relevant
parcel calculation should take into account prior actions by landowners that
affect economic value of their property and when it should not is very
difficult.
So let us assume a couple of things. First, we will assume that economic
value is affected by general market variables over which a landowner has
doctrine of federal navigable servitude applied when the plaintiffs dredged a privately owned
pond to create a private marina, and thereby opened the pond to a navigable waterway).
284 Id at 171-73.
285 See Nectow, 277 U.S. 183, 187 (1928) (asserting that the public's "health, safety,
convenience and general welfare" may be considered in zoning regulations).
286 Whitinsville Plaza v. Kotseas, 390 N.E.2d 243 (Mass. 1979) (overruling Justice Holmes in
Norcross v. James, 2 N.E. 946, 949 (Mass. 1885), on the issue of touch and concern.)
287 See Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024-25; Wright & Laughner, supra note 38, at 11,185-87.
288 See supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
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little or no control as well as actions taken by landowners to improve the
land or invest in the neighborhood. We should exclude such indirect, though
perhaps very plausible, economic effects as those caused by a landowner's
substantial donations to a county commissioner's campaign which
ultimately result in a rezoning of the landowner's land. It would seem that no
regulatory takings theory could adequately account for the luck of the draw,
the fortuitous accident that causes a city's development to move right in the
direction of a landowner's parcel, or the relative accident of discovering oil
on one's land. So political activism and blind luck should be excluded.
At the other extreme, there are very intentional actions that landowners
take to increase the value of their land. A developer may build mini-
mansions on one hundred acres of pristine forest land which has the
calculated effect of increasing the value of a piece of commercial land he
retained that is perfect for a grocery store to serve the new development. Or
a developer may agree to sell certain parcels of commercial land only so
long as the buyer agrees not to put up a discount store that will undermine
the value of the entire commercial development.2 9 In both instances, the
landowners' actions are motivated by the desire to improve the economic
value of his retained land. On the other hand, a landowner may reap the
accidental benefit of owning land adjacent to a big development that
suddenly makes her commercial land perfect for a grocery store. Can the
law treat the developer who owns both the subdivision and the commercial
land for the grocery store differently than the landowner who only owns the
commercial land? Thus, if a new zoning ordinance is enacted that prohibits
construction of the grocery store, are either or both entitled to
compensation? If only one is entitled to compensation, when does the
dynamic denominator rule tell us we should calculate the relevant parcel?
The very significant problems attached to using economic value in
determining the relevant property right demands a conceptual extension of
the severance rule.
A more refined rule that admits the role of prior actions affecting
market value, but not all fortuitous changes, would look to the
interrelationship of economic value between severed land and retained land.
Because a landowner should not be penalized for actions that simply
improve market value of land,290 under the dynamic denominator rule, a
landowner whose acts of severance elevate the value of retained land should
not be entitled to the full benefit of the increase in value in a takings
calculation only to the extent that the severed land increased in market
value as a result of the retained land. In other words, we will not penalize a
developer who expends money developing land in phase one of a
development which causes an increase of value in the undeveloped second
phase, so long as the value of lands in the first phase were not also elevated
by promises of activities that would occur on the second phase. If a
289 See, e.g., Whitinsviile Plaza v. Kotseas, 390 N.E.2d 243 (Mass. 1979) (presenting this fact
pattern on enforceability of restrictive covenants not to compete).
290 Because landowners should be encouraged to improve the value of land, no takings rule
should discourage improvement.
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developer builds houses on 90 acres of a 100 acre parcel and the remaining
10 acres increase in market value by 50% simply by virtue of the
development of the 90 acres, those actions should not be taken into account
in determining the relevant parcel because the increase is a result of
investment and risk, and is an activity we want to encourage.2 91
However, if the developer's retained 10 acres increase in market value
by 50% and he also received 125% of the value of the homes in the first 90
acres because he promised that a marina or club house would be built on the
remaining 10 acres, then the receipt of that extra value ties the 90 acres to
the remaining ten acres so that all 100 should be considered the relevant
parcel. Such a rule looks not to all actions by a landowner that increase
market value of retained lands, but only to increases that are integral to
increases on the previously sold land arising out of anticipated uses that are
now precluded by regulation.
292
In determining the relevant parcel, the calculation would look to see if
there is only a one-way increase in market value from the developed lands to
the undeveloped lands that are now regulated and undevelopable, in which
case the relevant parcel would include only the undeveloped and regulated
lands.293 But if the market value of the severed and developed lands included
expectations of development on the now-regulated retained lands, those
severed lots should be included in the relevant parcel determination.
Now let us go back to the residential development with the commercial
lot. If the landowner of the commercial lot did not own or participate in any
way in the development of the residential subdivision, then the increase of
value in his commercial lot was fortuitous and he should not be penalized
when actions beyond his control raise the value of his land and a new
regulation causes a significant loss. Economic value is properly a factor in
determining what was taken, what property rights he possessed, and the
level of compensation. But if the same landowner owns both the residential
subdivision and the commercial lot, and he reaped a benefit in increased
sales prices in the residential homes because of promises that the
commercial lot would be used to build a convenient grocery store, then a
downzoning of the commercial lot likely should not be compensable
because the relevant parcel should include the residential as well as the
commercial lands. They are integral to one another because their values are
interdependent.
The primary distinction here is that in the former instance, the owner of
the commercial lands has made no promises that the lot would be turned
into a grocery store, has reaped no profit from any such promise, and may
291 This does not mean actions should not be taken into account under the reciprocity rule
prong or the duty not to harm prong of the severance rule. Rather, if looking only at market
value, those ninety acres would not be included.
292 See Dist. Intown Properties, 198 F.3d 874, 880-82 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (applying such a rule);
Waterman, 745 A.2d 1000, 1021-22 (Md. 2000) (applying such a rule).
293 This is assuming there are no other reasons for linking them, as the reciprocity or
severance rules might require. This simply offers a way to evaluate the complex role of
landowner actions that affect economic value, not prior actions that might otherwise require
inclusion of developed lands into the relevant parcel.
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certainly opt not to use the commercial land in such a way. In the latter
instance, however, of a single developer who owns the land, the landowner
does have some obligation to build the grocery store if the sales of the
residential lots were made upon promises that he would build it. He owes a
duty to his severed lots. Further, he has already received some
compensation in terms of increased value of the residential lots from the
plans he promulgated to build the grocery store. A regulation that prohibits
the construction due to the presence of wetlands does not cause him as
much economic harm because he has already received some payment for
that land; his value has not decreased by 100%. But the landowner who owns
only the commercial lot, and who received a windfall in the increased value
of the commercial lot by virtue of development of the subdivision, may be
entitled to compensation when development is restricted because his
actions did not influence the increased market value and he has not received
any compensation from the development of the subdivision. The relevant
parcel can clearly be only the commercial lot because that is all he has ever
owned. Hence, the relevant parcel calculation should only step backwards to
more extensive landholdings that have been severed prior to the regulation
when the compensation for those severed lots included some increased
value from the presence of the retained, now-regulated lot.
This complicated rule on reciprocal effects of market value tells us to
consider severed and developed lots in the relevant parcel when there is an
economic interdependence, but not when the value of the parcels are
independent. This rule would apply only in situations in which the only link
between previously sold lands and retained lands is this link in market value.
If for some other reason, like severance duties or reciprocity, the relevant
parcel should include the previously sold land anyway, interconnected
market value is irrelevant (or is one additional reason for expanding the
regulatory window and enlarging the relevant parcel). The rule on market
value applies only when there is no additional reason to expand the
regulatory window and include previously sold lands in the relevant parcel,
but economic harm from the regulation is claimed by the landowner in a
regulatory takings challenge.
There is another difficult line to draw, however, between acts of
landowners that directly cause harm to neighboring land and can therefore
be restricted without requiring compensation under doctrines of nuisance
and under the reciprocity rule, and acts that only indirectly cause harm.
Certainly, a landowner can be prevented from building on land adjacent to
Lake Tahoe because the very construction directly causes harm to the
publicly owned lake through runoff.294 But the harm line is more difficult to
draw when it is less direct or is small on its own but pushes the system
beyond the tipping point in terms of environmental impact. When a
landowner develops 90 acres of homes and then finds his last 10 acres are
regulated because they are in wetlands that are necessary for the town's
water supply, further development is a threat to the public. Similarly, when
the 10 acres of now-regulated land contain spotted owl (Strix occidentais)
294 Tahoe-Sierr, 535 U.S. 302, 314-15 n.9 (2002).
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habitat and cannot be disturbed, the harm prevented by the regulation is not
a direct harm to neighboring lands, but is a harm to another public value, the
value of diversity of wildlife.
In the former instance of direct harm to neighboring land like that in
Tahoe-Sierra of runoff caused by development, the regulation is easy to
justify. The reciprocity rule which prohibits harm to neighboring or severed
lands would prevent building around Lake Tahoe without requiring
compensation because the right to harm one's neighbors is not a stick in the
bundle of rights in the first place.295 But the latter two examples of wetlands
and endangered species are more difficult. Where the harm to be prevented
is a diffuse public harm, there is much to support the idea that the public, as
a whole, should pay. Preserving wetlands and endangered species can
reasonably be taxed to the public as a whole because all development
causes incremental harm, and it is virtually impossible to draw the line and
treat later landowners differently than earlier landowners who participated
in the problem by building and filling earlier wetlands without regulation.
2 96
Regulations prohibiting development of wetlands or endangered
species habitats prevent harm to diffuse, public interests and in many cases
may require compensation, despite the dynamic denominator rule. Thus,
where a town's water supply depends on 100 acres of wetlands, and there
has been no encroachment on that 100 acres, then the first landowner who is
denied a permit to fill even 10 of those acres should be entitled to
compensation because he is being asked to dedicate his land to the greater
good of the entire town. Perhaps too, when the wetlands for the town had
originally consisted of 1,000 acres and 900 had been filled prior to
regulations that would have prevented such fill, and now the town must
protect all 100 remaining acres or lose its water supply, there would seem to
be an equally compelling argument for compensation because the landowner
must dedicate his land to protecting the interests of the entire town.
Drawing the line between earlier landowners who started the problem and
later landowners who simply perpetuate or tip it is very difficult to do. I am
not sure the dynamic denominator rule will provide a way to draw that line.
But at least one line can be drawn.
Where a developer had originally owned all 1,000 acres of the wetlands,
was responsible for filling and developing the 900, and had reaped a financial
benefit in so doing, the prohibition against filling the last 100 acres is very
different. Because the landowner directly contributed to creating the harm
(the survival of only 100 acres by the filling of the other 900 acres), he has
made 900 new households dependent on the 100 acres of wetlands and
therefore should not, under the severance rule, be allowed to harm their
interests. Furthermore, he has received some compensation in increased
value of the 900 acres he has already severed from the existence of 100 acres
of wetlands that guarantee a safe water supply. In this final example, the
295 See Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1051 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that "the state
has not 'taken' anything when it asserts its power to enjoin the nuisance activity").
296 Propei-y and Expropriations, supra note 18, at 16-17; A Dozen Propositions, supra note
18, at 268-70.
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direct obligation to the 900 landowners whose rights the developer created
justifies limits on his retained land to prevent harm to those rights under the
severance rule. Consequently, the relevant parcel should be the entire 1,000
acres, not just the 100 acres of regulated wetlands. The landowner's
voluntary development of 900 homes dependent on a safe water supply links
the previously sold lands with the retained lands so that the proper
calculation of the relevant parcel is the entire 1,000 acres.
These examples should show that not all regulatory takings claims by
developers will result in a finding of no compensation. Only those claims by
landowners who sever their land and make innocent third parties vulnerable
to harm from activities on the retained land, or those landowners who act in
ways to make their land vulnerable to the harm of regulation, will induce us
to look to earlier times and earlier landholdings for determining the relevant
parcel. Where a landowner only owns one parcel, and the entire parcel is
heavily regulated against development, there is no need to adjust the timing
of the relevant parcel calculation. This dynamic denominator theory,
therefore, only affects those landowners who own large enough parcels to
sever and sell off certain sections, those landowners whose prior
development activities are substantial enough to affect market value of prior
severed lands as well as retained lands, or those landowners whose
development caused direct harm to neighbors or the public.
Critics will argue that such a rule has a disproportionate effect on large
landowners and is therefore unfair. Why should their larger landholdings be
calculated into the relevant parcel analysis when they no longer even own
those holdings at the regulatory moment? In response, I suggest this is a
fairness rule that recognizes the traditional common law duties created by
severance, a rule of equity that prohibits landowners from acting in ways
that unfairly disadvantage neighbors, and a rule of justice that says
compensation will be paid only to landowners who are asked to dedicate
their land to the public good. Landowners who have already reaped payment
in some form for the value of the now-regulated land cannot complain that
they are denied compensation.2 9 7 In some sense, the dynamic denominator
rule penalizes large landowners who are active players in the land
development market. But it also recognizes that those landowners benefited
from a market that allowed development of the earlier phases of their land
and that the public is not required to guarantee the highest and best use of
all land. Where value has been obtained, by the sale of surface lands in Penn
Central, the rental of apartments in Loretto, or the sale of 900 homesites that
depend on a reliable source of groundwater, the Constitution should not
demand that the public grant the landowner a windfall through double
compensation.
297 Payment can include profits of nonliability for externalities imposed on other landowners
or the public.
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VII. Do WE REALLY NEED DYNAMIC DENOMINATORS?
Two important points need to be addressed. The first is whether the
reciprocity rule and severance rule are already incorporated into the
economic impact, character of the governmental action, and reasonable
investment-backed expectations prongs of Penn Central balancing. I do not
believe so, and I do not believe they should be brought into that calculation.
In the first place, while we might all enjoy the open-endedness of Penn
Central balancing, there are benefits to a certain amount of line-drawing.
Placing these issues under the relevant parcel means that, as a threshold
matter, large property holders likely will be treated differently than small
property holders, and strategic severance will no longer be rewarded. The
courts will also have fairly coherent rules for determining the relevant parcel
rather than the neither necessary nor sufficient factors listed in Ciampitti If
the relevant parcel calculation is cleaner and easier to make, perhaps there
will be fewer takings cases and hopefully lower administrative costs.
Second, I assert that severance actions and harms caused by previous
activities are easier to determine than the reasonableness of expectations
for future development. We can easily determine if a landowner sold land
prior to the regulation that made her more susceptible to the regulatory
harm. But whether it was reasonable for a landowner to believe she could
build a 77-lot development on 15 acres of wetlands, in 1968 or in 1988, is
much more difficult. Similarly, economic impact is easier to determine after
the fact rather than before. A developer who profited from promises that a
marina will be built on retained land can be held accountable for that profit.
Conversely, the landowner's claims that he will lose millions because he is
prohibited from building a marina are more difficult to prove.
Third, while I value the flexibility of ad hoc balancing under Penn
Central and decry the creation of categorical rules and other bright lines, the
relevant parcel calculation has an incredible ability to influence a case at the
same time the courts have developed very limited ways of dealing with it. By
providing a theory based on fairness and equity, and dependent on
landowner actions and choices, the relevant parcel issue becomes much
more coherent, yet still retains room for balancing at the next stage. My
theory of dynamic denominators simply seeks to contextualize and
rationalize the question of whether landowners are in fact similarly situated,
or whether their actions over time reveal the complex interplay of their own
choices, their neighbors' choices, and the regulatory response to conflicting
and ever-scarcer property uses.
Until now, the relevant parcel determination has been one of passive
ownership-asking what property rights and holdings a landowner
possesses at a given point in time. Not only does this artificially focus on
legal rights that are ever-changing, it obscures the profound difference
between ownership of property rights and the exercise of those property
rights. My theory of dynamic denominators turns away from static
ownership rights to voluntary actions that directly cause harm or immediate
and specific uses that conflict with one another. We could all have the most
robust and extensive property rights imaginable and never have problems if
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we all chose not to exercise them. A theory of dynamic denominators
recognizes that the problem lies in competing actions, not in competing legal
rights.
298
Second, the Court needs to think seriously about the theory behind the
Takings Clause. If, as many landowners allege, and many scholars reject,2 99
the Takings Clause is essentially a form of insurance to protect against
diminution in value from business practices and investments, then a
snapshot view of regulatory effects is appropriate. But if, on the other hand,
the Takings Clause was not designed to insure against gains and losses in
speculative investments, but rather to insure only against total
unrecoverable losses, then prior actions and prior profits matter. I see no
reason why a speculator who invests in the dot-coin market has no recourse
if he loses money due to SEC regulations, while a real estate developer or
mining company is insured against losses caused by EPA regulations. There
is no logic, only the trite reply that taking someone's home is different from
taking his money. Dynamic denominators puts teeth into that reply. Yes,
taking a man's birthplace, his retirement home, or even his beach access is
different from constraining his ability to develop and exploit land for a
profit. The big-market player is not similarly situated to the retiree who loses
his retirement home.
The idea that Takings Clause jurisprudence requires some principled
way to distinguish between business-as-usual investments and personhood-
dependent things is at the heart of dynamic denominators.3o This theory
does not preclude the investor from recovery, but it does further the
298 Dynamic denominators also provide a way to break out of the relativism of Coasian
property rights. Coase argued that incompatible land uses, in the absence of transaction costs,
are fundamentally equal; that preventing the polluter from poisoning the air harms his property
rights just as much as allowing him to pollute harms his neighbor's rights to clean air. See
generally Coase, supra note 229. Though I question Coase's refusal to accept that normative
values are inherent not only in deciding between competing uses, but in choices to make certain
entitlements property rights in the first place, dynamic denominators provide an escape to
Coase's relativism. By focusing on the exercise of property rights, and not possession of
property rights, the reciprocity rule provides a necessary buffer between competing rights. If
the rule is that you cannot exercise your property rights in any way that, if all similarly situated
parties did likewise, would lead to harm, then there is a natural brake built into the theory to
prevent exactly the competing uses contemplated by Coase. Although Coase admitted that a
property regime had to make normative decisions when property rights competed, he argued
that the two positions were equal from the perspective of the property rights themselves. That
assumes, however, that property rights exist as separate, distinct elements of a complex legal
regime, and are not fundamentally based on the values they serve in human flourishing. Id. at 8.
299 Krotoszynski, supra note 228. Also, Alyson Flournoy, whose invaluable comments on a
draft of this paper helped me to see the relevant differences between the Takings Clause as
insurance against risk and as insurance against total wipe-outs, suggests that implicit in the
Armstrong principle of fairness and justice is the assumption that landowners, like all property
owners, assume a certain amount of risk that values will fall or uses will be restricted. The
Takings Clause certainly was not designed to rectify every such harm. Instead, it more logically
represents a collective understanding that certain losses are too great to bear alone, and that
protection against such losses should only be provided where a property owner has acted
reasonably, both in terms of expectations and in terms of attempting to avoid losses through
reasonable acts of protecting his or her investment.
300 See generally Radin, supra note 82.
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background principles of a private property regime-the fostering of
democratic values, individual autonomy, and protection of life-affirming
uses of resources. The Takings Clause, I argue, was intended to protect the
individual from governmental overreaching; it was not intended to protect
big business in its utmost exploitation of resources at the expense of
individual small-property holders.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The rule of dynamic denominators may seem radical, but it is important
to realize that this expanded notion of the relevant parcel does not simply
result in compensation being denied to real estate developers like David
Lucas while allowing compensation to the retired couple who invested their
retirement savings in a parcel of beachfront land on which they planned to
build their dream house. Rather, just as we recognize that regulations have
dynamic effects over time and that landowners may not survive the amount
of time necessary to ripen an inverse condemnation claim, landowners'
actions have dynamic effects over time and the takings analysis should
examine pre-regulation actions that make a landowner susceptible to the
harm purportedly caused by a restrictive regulation. If a person owns fee
simple absolute to 500 acres and she knows that the spotted owl is a
protected species whose habitat is not to be destroyed, she should not be
able to sell everything she owns except the five trees in which there are
spotted owl nests and then claim a 100% taking of those five trees.3"' Such
strategic actions defeat the purpose of the regulation as well as undermine
the intent of the just compensation clause.
Moreover, the dynamic denominator rule takes traditional rules of
equity that are applied to private transactions and inserts them into the
takings equation through an expansion of the regulatory window and the
relevant parcel calculation. One might argue that this is simply an extension
of the background principles and nuisance exception of Lucas.3"2 But I
disagree. The Lucas rules, according to Justice Scalia, would apply only to
traditional property rights, maybe even core sticks only. The dynamic
denominator rule, on the other hand, would allow a way to factor economic
value into the relevant parcel calculation as well as acknowledge the role of
landowner behavior in the regulatory marketplace. Regulations generally do
not rise, full-blown, from the head of some legislative body. They tend
instead to be reactive to increasing harms and predations caused by land
development.303 To the extent landowners participate in or reap benefit from
activities that contributed to the harms, their claims of constitutional
violations should be viewed more skeptically.
301 Ironically, the Oregon Court of Appeals awarded compensation for a very similar action
involving bald eagles (Haliaeetus leucocephalus), rather than spotted owls, in Coast Range
Conifers, 76 P.3d 1148,1158 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
302 Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
" See Property and Expropriation, supra note 18.
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Now that the Court has reaffirmed the importance of Penn Central
balancing for the majority of taldngs cases, and has supposedly rejected
temporal and vertical severance while allowing only limited functional
severance, it needs to clarify further its denominator rules. Not having done
so at all in the horizontal severance context, and having muddied up most of
the other severance contexts, the Court is well-poised to adopt a rule like
that of dynamic denominators. Such a rule would treat landowners
differently, an outcome that will be criticized by the Epstein crowd. At the
same time, however, it can accommodate many of the intractable line-
drawing problems facing the Court in both the relevant parcel and timing
calculations. And it draws on traditional rules of equity already at work in
private property relations. Opening the regulatory window to recognize the
dynamic nature of property and the reciprocal impact of land-use decisions
through adoption of such a rule will lead to more coherent outcomes and
will move us closer to balancing the goals of harm-prevention through
regulation and fostering responsible use of land.
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